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SECURITIES REGULATION - TENDER OFFER - CONDUCT IN
CONNECTION WITH A TENDER OFFER REQUIRES AN ELEMENT
OF DECEPTION TO BE CONSIDERED MANIPULATIVE UNDER SEC-
TION 14(E) OF THE WILLIAMS ACT. Schreiber v. Burlington
Northern, Inc., 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1984).
In Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.,' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit2 held that conduct in connec-
tion with a tender offer' is not a prohibited "manipulative"" act
within the meaning of Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 19341 unless it contains an element of deception. The court predi-
cated its conclusion primarily upon its interpretation of the Congres-
sional intent' behind amending the Securities Exchange Act of 19341
with the Williams Act.8 By holding that manipulative acts must in-
1. 731 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1984).
2. The Third Circuit panel was composed of Judges Adams, Sloviter, and Teitelbaum.
Judge Adams delivered the opinion of the court.
3. The term "tender offer" has not been officially defined by either Congress or the
Securities and Exchange Commission, but a House report has broadly described the term as
follows:
The cash tender offer has become an increasingly favored method of acquiring
control of publicly held corporations. The offer normally consists of a bid by an
individual or group to buy shares of a company - usually at a price above the
market price. Those accepting the offer are said to tender their stock for
purchase. The person making the offer obligates himself to purchase all or a
specified portion of the tendered shares if certain specified conditions are met.
H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2811. For a more detailed discussion of what constitutes a tender offer, see generally Note,
Toward A Definition of "Tender Offer", 19 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 191 (1982); Note, What is a
Tender Offer?, 37 WASH & LEE L. REV. 908 (1980).
4. See infra note 45.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). This section states as follows:
(e) Untrue statement of material fact or omission of fact with respect to tender
offer
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of mate-
rial fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the state-
ments made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not
misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or
practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders,
or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such
offer, request, or invitation. The Commission shall for the purposes of this sub-
section, by rules and regulation define, and prescribe means reasonably designed
to prevent, such acts and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
[hereinafter cited as Section 14(e)].
6. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
clude an element of deception,9 the Third Circuit has involved itself
in an ongoing debate within the legal community'0 as to the role
federal courts should play in determining the substantive fairness of
tender offers.
During December 1982, R-H Holdings Corporation and its par-
ent corporation," Burlington Northern Inc., planned to usurp corpo-
rate control of the El Paso Gas Company by purchasing a majority
interest in El Paso common stock. On December 21, 1982, R-H pub-
licly announced a tender offer for 25,100,000 shares 2 of El Paso
common stock at twenty-four dollars per share - a price well above
the then current rate. The offer, however, was subject to R-H's right
to withdraw prior to accepting any share for payment.' 3 Although El
Paso shareholders fully subscribed to the tender offer before its De-
cember 30, 1982 deadline, R-H decided to exercise its option to
withdraw. This decision resulted from an accord between R-H, Bur-
lington, and El Paso. After initially countering the takeover bid with
a variety of defensive measures,' 4 El Paso's management decided to
negotiate with R-H and Burlington. The parties reached an agree-
ment and publicly disclosed it on January 10, 1983. In exchange for
9. Schreiber, 731 F.2d at 166.
10. See Note, Target Defensive Tactics as Manipulative Under Section 14(e), 84
COLUM. L. REV. 228, 231-34 (1984) (surveys judicial opinions which differ in their interpreta-
tion of Section 14(e)).
11. R-H Holdings Corp. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Burlington Northern, Inc.
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 197, 199 (D. Del. 1983). See generally
N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 90-96 (1959) (provides a general discussion of par-
ent and subsidiary corporate relationships).
12. The number of shares requested by R-H in the first tender offer constituted a slight
majority of El Paso's common stock. Schreiber, 568 F. Supp. at 199.
13. The provision by which R-H preserved its right to withdraw the tender offer was
worded as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of the Offer, the Purchaser shall not be
required to accept for payment or pay for tendered Shares, or may terminate or
amend the Offer . . . if, at any time on or after December 17, 1982 and prior to
the acceptance for payment of any such Shares ... , any of the following shall
occur: . . . if, in the sole judgment of the Purchaser, in any such case, regardless
of the circumstances (including any action or inaction by the Purchaser) giving
rise to any such condition, such condition makes it inadvisable to proceed with
the Offer and/or with such purchase or payment.
Id.
14. A defensive measure is any action undertaken by the management of a corporation
to discourage or prevent a takeover attempt by another corporation. See Note, supra note 10,
at 229. For a thorough discussion of the variety of defensive measures utilized by corporations,
see generally A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND PLANNING 113-55
(1978); E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 193-206 (1977); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
El Paso's management countered R-H's tender offer by filing suits against R-H and Bur-
lington in both the Delaware Court of Chancery and the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas. El Paso informed the Securities and Exchange Commission that it
planned to dispose of its assets. El Paso also issued a new class of preferred stock and amended
its corporate by-laws. Schreiber, 568 F. Supp. at 199.
golden parachute contracts,15 El Paso management agreed to cease
opposing the takeover attempt. In addition, R-H withdrew its origi-
nal tender offer in favor of a second, smaller offer. The second tender
offer requested only twenty-one million shares at twenty-four dollars
per share. R-H agreed to purchase directly from El Paso the addi-
tional shares it needed to acquire a majority interest.' 6
El Paso shareholders reacted very favorably to the second
tender offer. The shares tendered greatly exceeded the amount re-
quested, 7 and, as a consequence, R-H could only accept a certain
percentage of each individual's tendered shares.' 8 El Paso stockhold-
ers who tendered shares under both offers, suffered financially from
the withdrawal of the original offer. Able to sell the full amount of
their shares under the original offer, they now were entitled to sell
only a portion of their shares. 9 Barbara Schreiber, one such stock-
holder, brought an action for damages on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated, in the United States District Court for the
District of Delaware against El Paso, El Paso's directors, Burlington,
and R-H. 0 She alleged two separate violations of Section 14(e).
First she contended that the withdrawal of the original tender offer
in favor of a second was a manipulative act prohibited by Section
14(e). Second she argued that failure to reveal the contracts given to
certain El Paso directors was a transgression of Section 14(e)'s dis-
closure requirement.2
At trial, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's com-
plaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted."22 In granting the motion, the district court concluded that
Ms. Schreiber failed to state a claim for violation of Section 14(e)
because she neglected to allege, under either theory, that damages
had resulted from the purported deception. 3 On appeal, the Third
Circuit, while addressing both allegations of the plaintiff, dealt pri-
marily with the question of whether Section 14(e)'s phase "manipu-
lative acts or practices" encompassed activity not involving
15. "So-called 'golden parachutes' generally provide multi-year benefits to high level
executives of a target company after a takeover if they are discharged without cause or down-
graded by the new management." Schreiber, 731 F.2d at 165 n.2. See generally SHARK
REPELLENTS AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES 425-36 (R. Winter, M. Stumpf, & G. Hawkins ed.
1983) (addresses definition, structure, and purpose of "golden parachute" agreements).
16. The defendant directors, who had not tendered their shares in the original offer,
would be able to tender their shares during the second offer. Schreiber, 568 F. Supp. at 200.
17. The tender offer requested only 21 million shares, but over 40 million shares were
tendered. Schreiber, 731 F.2d at 165.
18. The Williams Act requires pro rata acceptance of shares in tender offers that are
over subscribed. See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6)(1982).
19. See supra note 18.
20. Schreiber, 731 F.2d at 165.
21. Id.
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
23. Schreiber, 731 F.2d at 164.
deception.24
In 1968 the Williams Act25 was enacted as an amendment to
the Securities Exchange Act of 193426 to expand the protection pro-
vided by federal law for individuals who invest funds in corporate
securities. 27 Three sections 28 of the Williams Act set forth the re-
quirements that must be fulfilled when making a tender offer29 - a
method of achieving corporate control that achieved widespread pop-
ularity during the 1960's.3° In contrast to other methods of acquiring
corporate control, 31 tender offers were not subject to federal securi-
ties law prior to 1968. Congress passed the Williams Act32 primarily
to remove this gap in investor protection.
Section 14(e), 33 one of the tender offer sections, is a "broad an-
tifraud provision ' 34 patterned in large measure upon Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5.3 5 The section prohibits any
24. Id. at 164.
25. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (amended 1970) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1982)). Sections 13(d), 13(e), 14(d), 14(e), and 14(f) were
amended to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by the Williams Act.
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk.
27. 113 CONG. REC. 854-56 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams, co-sponsor of the
legislation). See also infra note 32.
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
29. See supra note 4.
30. In 1960 only eight tender offers occurred, but in 1966 the number of tender offers
increased to over one hundred. The rapid growth in popularity was due primarily to the speed
with which a tender offer can be executed. A tender offer can often be successfully completed
in a matter of days. 113 CONG. REC. 24664 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
31. See generally 15 W. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS §§ 7040-46.1 (1983) (discussion of mergers, consolidations, and combinations
as devices by which one corporation attains control over another).
32. "This legislation [Williams Act] will close a significant gap in investor protection
under the Federal Securities laws by requiring the disclosure of pertinent information to stock-
holders when persons seek to obtain control of a corporation by a cash tender offer. ... 113
CONG. REC. 854 (1967) (statement of Sen. Williams).
33. Section 14(e) was amended by the Act of Dec. 22, 1970, § 2, 84 Stat. 1497 (1970)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982)). The amendment, which added the final
sentence to the current Section 14(e), provided the Securities and Exchange Commission with
rulemaking power to prohibit acts which it deemed to be within the scope of the section. Sena-
tor Williams, author of both the original Section 14(e) and its amended version, described the
purpose of the amendment as follows:
The third change which this proposed legislation would make in existing law
would be to give the Securities and Exchange Commission rulemaking power
with respect to fraudulent, deceptive and manipulative activities made in connec-
tion with a tender offer.
This provision is of the utmost necessity. The techniques used in corporate
takeovers have become increasingly sophisticated and change rapidly. This is
particularly true in situations where the takeover is resisted by incumbent man-
agement - industrial warfare develops. Claims and counterclaims, charges and
countercharges are hurled back and forth. Efforts are often made to influence
the price of the securities involved. The Commission must be given full rulemak-
ing powers to deal with these rapidly changing problems.
116 CONG. REC. 3024 (1970) (statement of Sen. Williams).
34. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 283 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
35. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982). See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice in connection
with a tender offer. Unfortunately, however, section 14(e) itself
neither explains nor defines the meaning of fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative.3 6 This failure to clearly distinguish between the types
of conduct covered by its language has resulted in a judicial contro-
versy concerning whether the presence of deception is always re-
quired in establishing the existence of a manipulative act.
3
7
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.3s was the first case to con-
sider what constituted a manipulative act under Section 14(e).39 In
Mobil, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
40
held that a corporation's lock-up 41 and stock options, 42 which were
employed to counter a takeover bid, comprised manipulative activity
under Section 14(e) despite the absence of deception by the corpora-
tion. The Sixth Circuit presented four reasons for rejecting the con-
tention that manipulative acts in tender offers must include decep-
tion. First, the interpretation of the term "manipulative"' must be
flexible to incorporate any new tactics or techniques 3 for acquiring
corporate control that might arise in the rapidly changing securities
field.44 Second, the judicial history of the concept of manipulation in
relation to corporate securities45 suggests that the term should in-
36. See Section 14(e), supra note 5.
37. See generally Weiss, Defensive Responses to Tender Offers and the Williams Act's
Prohibition Against Manipulation, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1087, 1095-98 (1982) (commentator
analyzes the language of Section 14(e) in light of the history of the term "manipulation" in
securities law).
38. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
39. Schreiber, 731 F.2d at 165.
40. Mobil, 669 F.2d at 375.
41. The term "lock-up" describes a defensive tactic often utilized when two corpora-
tions are vying for control of a third corporation by use of competing tender offers. The
threatened corporation enters an agreement with one of the attacking corporations providing
that corporation with certain advantages designed to discourage or thwart the other corpora-
tion's takeover attempt. Note, "Lock-up" Enjoined Under Section 14(e) of Securities Ex-
change Act, 12 SETON HALL 881, 882 (1982). See generally Note, The Future of Lock-ups
after Mobil v. Marathon Oil, ST. Louis U.L.J. 261, 264-266 (1983) (describes the advantages
and disadvantages of the lock-up as a device to prevent takeover attempts).
Mobil Oil Co. and United States Steel Corp. were both attempting to takeover Marathon
Oil. Marathon granted U.S. Steel a lock-up option, which provided that U.S. Steel would have
the right to buy Marathon's most valuable asset, the Yates Oil Field, if its tender offer failed
to gain a majority of Marathon's common stock. Marathon hoped Mobil would be dissuaded
from its takeover attempt since a victory in the tender offer contest with U.S. Steel would not
provide access to Marathon's prime asset. Mobil, 669 F.2d at 367.
42. U.S. Steel was granted a present, irrevocable right to purchase 10 million author-
ized but unissued shares of Marathon common stock, which constituted approximately 17 per-
cent of Marathon's outstanding shares. Id.
43. See supra note 33.
44. Mobil, 669 F.2d at 374.
45. Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1359-61 (N.D. Tex.
1979) discusses the history of the term "manipulation" in the context of securities from its
origin in English common law to the adoption of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
court concluded that the term "manipulation" was intended to encompass any activity interfer-
ing with the workings of securities markets by misleading investors or distorting prices. See
also 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1529-70 (2d ed. 1961) (concludes that the English
clude any deliberate conduct intended to harm investors by "control-
ling or artificially affecting the price of securities.""6 Third, since
Congress' essential purpose in drafting the Williams Act was the
protection of shareholders confronted with a tender offer 47 all activi-
ties that could adversely affect the ability of shareholders to maxi-
mize their earnings should be classified as manipulative under Sec-
tion 14(e). Requiring only mere disclosure under the statute would
defeat congressional intent since publicly disclosed activities damag-
ing to the interests of investors would not fall within the scope of
Section 14(e). 4a Last, to require the presence of deceptive activity to
establish manipulation would effectively erase manipulative acts and
practices as a separate category under Section 14(e). The section's
separate classification of deceptive and manipulative activity would
be unnecessary since deception would be required in both
instances.49
The Mobil opinion has not been favorably received by other fed-
eral courts.50 Though not addressing the manipulation question, sev-
eral courts5" have differed with Mobil's interpretation of the con-
gressional purpose underlying the Williams Act and Section 14(e).
Decisions from several other federal courts, of which Schreiber is the
most recent, have directly contradicted the holding of Mobil.52
In Martin Marietta Corp v. Bendix Corp.,53 the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland54 held that a corpora-
tion's use of a counter tender offer55 to thwart another corporation's
takeover bid was not a manipulative act in violation of Section 14(e).
common law concept of manipulation as any activity interfering with the free market mecha-
nism was incorporated by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
46. Mobil, 669 F.2d at 374 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199
(1976)).
47. Mobil, 669 F.2d at 376.
48. Id. at 376-77.
49. Id.
50. Pacific Realty Trust v. APC Investments, Inc., 685 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1982) is
the only federal circuit decision that has endorsed the interpretation of Section 14(e) adopted
by Mobil. "There are instances where violations of this antifraud provision [Section 14(e)] are
unrelated to the information supplied to the shareholders." Id. at 1086. The court, however,
found no activity warranting application of Mobil in the case before it. Id.
51. See, e.g., Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 288 (4th Cir. 1983) (sole purpose
of Section 14(e) is to ensure adequate disclosure to shareholders who are deciding whether to
tender their shares); Panter, 646 F.2d at 283 (Section 14(e) designed to ensure that sharehold-
ers who are confronted with a tender offer have adequate and accurate information); Lewis v.
McGraw, 619 F.2d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980) (Section 14(e)
intended to ensure that investors will not have to respond to a tender offer without adequate
information),
52. Schreiber, 731 F.2d at 164 (notes several previous decisions criticizing the Mobil
holding). See infra notes 61 and 65.
53. 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982).
54. Id. at 627-28.
55. In response to Bendix's tender offer for Marietta shares, Martin Marietta re-
sponded with its own tender offer for Bendix shares. The district court described this activity
as a "Pac-Man struggle" since each corporation was attempting to engulf the other. Id. at 625.
Employing an exhaustive analysis of both legislative history and
prior judicial opinions, 56 the district court concluded that the under-
lying purpose of the Williams Act is protection of investors con-
fronted with a tender offer by assuring full and fair disclosure of
pertinent information. 57 Any action brought under Section 14(e), in-
cluding a claim alleging manipulative acts, thus, must demonstrate
that the corporate entities involved have either disseminated false
data or withheld relevant information.
5 8
In two 1983 cases 9 decided several months apart, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit6 ° also held that de-
ception is a necessary element of manipulative acts under Section
14(e). In Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Co.,"
1 the Second Circuit 2
held that a corporation's scheme to counter a takeover bid by pub-
licly seeking a white knight6" was not manipulation. In Data Probe
Acquisition Corp. v. Datalab, Inc.,6 4 the Second Circuit6" held that a
right to buy stock given by one corporation to another to thwart a
tender offer by a third corporation was not a manipulative act. In
each case, the court grounded its holding on the observation that the
primary purpose behind the tender offer legislation was the protec-
tion of shareholders through adequate disclosure of financial infor-
mation. The court noted that Section 14(e) is designed to ensure that
the investor has adequate information upon which to make an intelli-
gent investment decision.66 In Buffalo, the Second Circuit also noted
that the business judgment67 of the threatened corporation's direc-
56. Martin relies primarily on Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), which
extensively analyzed the legislative history of the Williams Act. The Supreme Court noted,
"The sponsors of this legislation [Williams Act] were plainly sensitive to the suggestion that
the measure would favor one side or the other in control contests; however, they made it clear
that the legislation was designed solely to get needed information to the investor, the constant
focal point of the committee hearings." Id. at 30-31.
57. Martin, 549 F. Supp. at 627-28.
58. Id. at 628.
59. See infra notes 61 and 64.
60. See infra notes 62 and 65 and accompanying text.
61. 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 550 (1984).
62. Id. at 760.
63. The term "white knight" is used in connection with a defensive tactic used by a
corporation threatened with a hostile takeover. A corporation may attempt to thwart the take-
over bid by merging with a corporation of its choice. The friendly corporation is dubbed a
white knight. Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64
CORNELL L. REV. 901, 931 (1979). See also Profuser, Tender Offer Manipulation: Tactics
and Strategies after Marathon, 36 Sw. L.J. 975, 981 n.52 (1982) (merger agreements be-
tween a corporation and a white knight are intended to rebuff unwanted tender offers).
64. 722 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1326 (1984).
65. Id. at 4.
66. Compare Data Probe, 722 F.2d at 4 (notes that misrepresentation is an essential
element of a Section 14(e) cause of action) with Buffalo, 717 F.2d at 760 (states that an
essential ingredient of a Section 14(e) cause of action is the omission or misstatement of mate-
rial facts).
67. Actions by corporate directors are often protected by the Business Judgment Rule,
which "sustains corporate transactions and immunizes management from liability where the
tors should not be disturbed since its stockholders received greater
remuneration6" due to the directors' actions.69
In Data Probe, the goal of maintaining the distinction between
state substantive corporate law and federal securities law greatly in-
fluenced the court's reasoning.7" Although acknowledging that the
actions of certain corporate directors could possibly be a violation of
the fiduciary duty owed to shareholders,7 ' the Second Circuit refused
to extend the coverage of Section 14(e) to an area traditionally regu-
lated by state law.72
Relying on both Buffalo and Data Probe,7" Schreiber provides
the most recent criticism of the Mobil holding.' According to
Schreiber, both the legislative history75 and the United States Su-
preme Court interpretation 76 of the Williams Act establish that the
Act was "designed to make relevant facts known so that sharehold-
ers have a fair opportunity to make their decisions." 77 Section 14(e)
of the Williams Act, therefore, was not enacted to provide a federal
cause of action for any harm suffered in connection with a tender
offer. Rather, Congress intended Section 14(e) merely to ensure that
sufficient information would be available to investors confronted with
a tender offer. Section 14(e) prohibits only activity that is designed
transaction is within the powers of the corporation and the authority of management, and
involves the exercise of due care and compliance with applicable fiduciary duties." HENN &
ALEXANDER, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 661-63. See generally Prentice, Target Board Abuse of
Defensive Tactics. Can Federal Law Be Mobilized to Overcome the Business Judgment
Rule?, 8 J. OF CORP. L. 337 (1983) (analyzes the inherent conflict of interest between the
management and shareholders of a corporation confronted with a tender offer and the effect it
could have on the Business Judgment Rule).
68. The tender offer price for shares rose from $25.00 to $37.50 per share. Buffalo, 717
F.2d at 759.
69. Id.
70. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) aptly described the distinction between state and
federal corporation law: "Corporations are creatures of state law, and investors commit their
funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where federal law expressly
requires certain responsibility of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern
the internal affairs of the corporation." Id. at 84.
71. Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. II1. 1969)
provides a succinct statement of corporate management's fiduciary duty. The court stated:
[Mlanagement has the responsibility [under state law] to oppose [tender] offers
which, in its best judgment, are detrimental to the company or its stockholders.
In arriving at such a judgment, management should be scrupulously fair in con-
sidering the merits of any proposal submitted to its stockholders. The officers'
and directors' informed opinion should result from that strict impartiality which
is required by their fiduciary duties. After taking these steps, the company may
then take any step not forbidden by law to counter the attempted capture.
Id. at 712-13. See also Henn & Alexander, supra note 67, at 625-28.
72. Data Probe, 722 F.2d at 6.
73. Schreiber, 731 F.2d at 165.
74. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 32.
76. E.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975) (sole purpose of
Williams Act is to ensure that an investor is provided with needed information).
77. Schreiber, 731 F.2d at 166 n.3 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811, 2813).
to either mislead or deceive shareholders faced with a tender offer.7
All acts prohibited by Section 14(e), including those described as
manipulative, must therefore embody an element of deception.7 9
The Schreiber court's conclusion that Section 14(e) compels
only information disclosure also relies on the Supreme Court's analy-
sis80 of the term "manipulative device" found in Securities and Ex-
change Commission Rule 10b-5 1' - a rule extremely similar to Sec-
tion 14(e) in both wording and effect.8 2 In Santa Fe Industries, Inc.
v. Green, the high court narrowly defined manipulative device to in-
clude only conduct designed to mislead investors by artificially af-
fecting the securities market.8" Applying this definition to the manip-
ulation claim before it, the Third Circuit concluded that
manipulative acts must always involve deceit or nondisclosure.84
The Schreiber court was also concerned about the impact that a
broad construction of the section would have on the traditional rela-
tionship between federal and state law. 85 The court admitted that
Section 14(e)'s language was sufficiently ambiguous to cause reason-
able differences of opinion about its scope since the section specifi-
cally prohibits both deceptive and manipulative acts.
Inclusion of both categories within the statute could arguably be
construed as indicating that Congress intended to regulate more than
just deceptive conduct. 86 Although adopted by Mobil,87 this rationale
78. Schreiber, 731 F.2d at 165-66.
79. Id. at 166.
80. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976).
In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court stated that in the context of SEC Rule lOb-5 the term
"manipulative" encompasses any "action" affecting market activity in order to mislead inves-
tors." Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477. In Ernst, the court noted, "[Manipulation under SEC Rule
lob-5I connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by con-
trolling or artificially affecting the price of securities. Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199.
81. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facil-
ity or of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
82. "Section 14(e) is a somewhat unique case of a statute patterned after a regulation;
it tracks in large measure the language [of] Rule lOb-5." Hundahl, 465 F. Supp. at 1336. See
also Atchley v. Qonaar Corp., 704 F.2d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 1983) (notes that Section 14(e)'s
language is patterned after Rule lOb-5); Panter, 646 F.2d at 283 (states that Section 14(e) is
modeled after Rule lOb-5).
83. 430 U.S. at 1302. See also supra note 80.
84. Schreiber, 731 F.2d at 166.
85. Id.
86. Id.
was rejected by Schreiber.88 In the Schreiber court's view if the defi-
nition of manipulative acts did not include an element of deception
federal courts would be called to assume jurisdiction of litigation in-
volving questions concerning the substantive propriety of tender of-
fers.89 This would result in the federalization of a large segment of
corporate law, traditionally a state matter."0 The Third Circuit in
Schreiber refused to embark on this radical course of action.9 1
The plaintiff's second theory of recovery, which alleged a decep-
tive act in violation of Section 14(e), was summarily dismissed when
the court found no causal connection between the allegedly nondis-
closed golden parachute contracts92 and the plaintiff's financial loss.
The court's finding stemmed from the refusal by R-H to accept the
tendered shares, which caused the plaintiff's injury, prior to the con-
tract negotiations.9"
Schreiber sharply delineated the tension existing between the
common judicial interpretation of Section 14(e) and the actual lan-
guage of the statute. With the notable exception of Mobil, the
weight of judicial authority, including Schreiber, has construed Sec-
tion 14(e) solely as a disclosure provision despite the fact that the
section specifically prohibits both deceptive and manipulative acts.
Any activity in connection with a tender offer that is publicly dis-
closed, therefore, is not subject to federal securities law under Sec-
tion 14(e). Schreiber's conclusion94 that deception must be an ele-
ment of any cause of action under Section 14(e) should prevail in a
climate controlled by strict judicial observance of the distinction be-
tween state corporate law and federal securities law.
87. Mobil, 669 F.2d at 376-77.
88. Schreiber, 731 F.2d at 166.
89. "Absent a requirement of deception, the Williams Act would mandate that the
federal courts supervise the substantive fairness of practically all tender offers." Id.
90. See supra note 70.
91. Schreiber, 731 F.2d at 166. See also Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479 (expressing reluc-
tance to federalize state corporate law).
92. See supra note 15.
93. Schreiber, 731 F.2d at 166.
94. Id.
[Casenote by James A. Jandal.
TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-SOCIAL HOST WHO SERVES LIQUOR TO A
VISIBLY INTOXICATED ADULT GUEST KNOWING THAT GUEST
WILL THEREAFTER OPERATE A MOTOR VEHICLE MAY BE HELD
LIABLE FOR INJURIES TO THIRD PARTIES CAUSED BY GUEST'S
NEGLIGENCE. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219
(1984).
In Kelly v. Gwinnell,t the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
that a social host who serves liquor to a visibly intoxicated adult
guest may be held liable for injuries caused by the guest's subse-
quent drunk driving.' The court, basing its decision on common law
negligence principles,3 stated that the crux of the issue was whether
a duty should be imposed on social hosts to protect third parties
from the foreseeable risks of the host's negligent dispensing of alco-
hol.4 In imposing such a duty, the court designated New Jersey as
the only state in the nation to allow a pure common law cause of
action against social hosts who contribute to the intoxication of their
adult guests.5 The court was careful to point out, however, that the
precise scope of the host's duty would have to be developed in future
cases.
6
Donald Gwinnell, a painting contractor, left his home early one
evening to assist Joseph Zak, a subcontractor, whose truck was
mired in mud. After failing to free the truck, Gwinnell drove Zak
I. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
2. The court narrowly limited its holding to cases in which a host directly serves alco-
hol to a visibly intoxicated guest knowing that the guest will soon be driving. Id. at 546, 476
A.2d at 1228.
3. Id. at 543, 476 A.2d at 1221.
4. Id. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222. Although it had been dealt with in lower courts, this
was the first time the Supreme Court of New Jersey had addressed the issue. See Linn v.
Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (App. Div. 1976) (social host held liable for service
of a minor); Figuly v. Knoll, 185 N.J. Super. 477, 449 A.2d 564 (Law Div. 1982) (social host
held liable for serving visibly intoxicated adult).
5. See Note, Social Host Liability for Injuries Caused by the Acts of an Intoxicated
Guest, 59 N.D.L. REV. 445, 475 (1983). The supreme courts of California and Oregon have
allowed such a cause of action, but their decisions have been legislatively abrogated or limited.
Id. at 471-73. Other jurisdictions may impose liability for service to persons with certain phys-
ical or mental disabilities, but this is an established exception to the old common law doctrine
which did not attach liability to those who served alcohol to "ordinary able-bodied men." See
Cantor v. Anderson, 126 Cal. App. 3d 124, 178 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1981); Comment, Liquor, the
Law, and California: One Step Forward - Two Steps Backward, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 335,
367-69 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Liquor, the Law, and California]; 45 AM. JUR.
2D Intoxicating Liquors §§ 553, 554 (1969); Annot., 97 A.L.R. 3D 528 (1980) (liability based
on tort apart from violation of liquor laws); See also infra notes 18-82 and accompanying text.
6. 96 N.J. at 556, 476 A.2d at 1228.
home, and then accepted an invitation to come in for a drink. Gwin-
nell stayed at Zak's house for an hour or two, during which time
Gwinnell consumed two or three drinks of scotch.7 While driving
home, Gwinnell collided head on with a vehicle operated by Marie
Kelly. Kelly was seriously injured. Based on a blood test taken
shortly after the accident, an expert' concluded that Gwinnell had
been heavily intoxicated at the time of the accident and had been
visibly intoxicated while at Zak's residence. 9
Kelly sued Gwinnell, who filed a third party complaint against
Zak and his wife.1 ° Kelly then amended her compliant to include the
Zaks as direct defendants." The Zaks filed a motion for summary
judgment, 2 which the trial court granted. The New Jersey Superior
Court, Appellate Division, affirmed."3 In refusing to allow a cause of
action against social hosts for the negligent acts of their intoxicated
adult guests the Appellate Division placed itself in accord with the
vast majority of jurisdictions that had considered the same ques-
tion."'4 By doing so, however, the court halted a growing New Jersey
trend"s to expand the liability of one who serves alcoholic bever-
ages. 6 By overturning the Appellate Division, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court has revitalized the broad liability cases and has taken
them one step further.'"
At common law, the furnishing of intoxicating liquor to an able-
bodied man was not a tort.'8 Thus, absent a statute, one injured by
7. 96 N.J. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220. It is unclear how much alcohol Gwinnell actually
consumed. Zak stated that Gwinnell had two drinks, each containing one shot of liquor.
Kelly's expert certified that based on Gwinnell's blood alcohol reading of .286%, he may have
had up to 13 drinks. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 190 N.J. Super. 320, 321, 463 A.2d 387, 388 (App.
Div. 1983).
8. 96 N.J. at 541, 476 A.2d at 1220.
9. id.
10. See N.J. CT. C.P.R. 4:8-1(a) (defendant is permitted to serve a summons and com-
plaint upon a person who may be liable to him for part of the claim against him).
I1. See id. at 4:8-1(b) (plaintiff given 20 days after third party complaint to amend his
pleading to include the third party defendant).
12. See id. at 4:46-2 (to win a summary judgment, movant must show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law).
13. 190 N.J. Super. 320, 463 A.2d 387 (App. Div. 1983).
14. See 96 N.J. at 561, 476 A.2d at 1231 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting); Note, supra note
6, at 475.
15. In 1959, the Supreme Court of New Jersey handed down the landmark decision of
Rappaport v. Nichols, the first successful common law negligence action against a tavern own-
er. See infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
16. Id. at 325-26, 463 A.2d at 390-91. In Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d
15 (App. Div. 1976), the Appellate Division allowed a cause of action against social hosts who
served minors. Id. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
17. 96 N.J. at 555-56, 476 A.2d at 1228.
18. 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 553 (1969). The rule was qualified in some
jurisdictions to allow recovery by third persons against one who sold liquor to one "in such a
state of helplessness or debauchery as to be deprived of his willpower or responsibility for his
behavior." Id. at § 554. For a list of ten jurisdictions which expressly adhere to the common
law rule of non-liability, see Note, 9 LAND & WATER L. REV. 285, 290 n.49 (1984). See also
McCue v. Klein, 60 Tex. 168 (1883) (liability for inducing drunkard to drink three pints of
an intoxicated actor had no cause of action against the person who
supplied the alcohol. 9 The asserted rationale for this rule of non-
liability was that no proximate cause20 existed between the furnish-
ing of the liquor and the subsequent injury." The harshness of this
common law rule has been partially mitigated by the passage of
dram shop acts,22 the first of which was adopted in Wisconsin in
1850.23 Spawned by the temperance movement, dram shop acts
sought to discourage the sale of liquor by making tavern keepers
strictly liable 24 for any injury to person, property, or means of sup-
port caused by the keepers' sale of liquor.25
Although dram shop acts provide an alternative to the harshness
of the common law rule, they generally have not been extended to
cover social hosts.2 The landmark case rejecting such an expansion
is Cruse v. Aden.27 In that case, Julia Ann Cruse sought recovery
under the Illinois dram shop act2" when her husband died after being
whiskey in rapid succession, causing death); Ibach v. Jackson, 148 Or. 92, 35 P.2d 672 (1934)
(getting woman so intoxicated that she fell and was killed).
19. 45 AM. JuR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 554 (1969). See, e.g., Cole v. Rush, 45
Cal.2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955); Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976).
20. 45 AM. JuR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 553 (1969); Fleckner v. Dionne, 94 Cal.
App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949). Dean Prosser has defined proximate cause as "essentially a
question of whether the law will extend the responsibility for the conduct to the consequences
which have in fact occurred." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 42 (4th ed.
1971). He further states that "every question which arises in connection with 'proximate
cause' [should be stated] in the form of a question: was the defendant under a duty to protect
the plaintiff against the event which did in fact occur?" Id. For additional discussion of judi-
cial determination of duty and "proximate cause" see generally L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF
PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927) (discusses the confusion between duty and causation); Bingham,
Some Suggestions Concerning Legal Cause at Common Law (pts I & 2) 9 COLUM. L. REV.
16, 136 (1909) (discussion of the principle of "proximate cause").
21. Accord State ex rel Joyce v. Hatfield, 197 Md. 249, 254, 78 A.2d 754, 756 (1951)
("Human beings, drunk or sober, are responsible for their own torts.").
22. Dram shop acts are also referred to as civil damage acts. GRAHAM, Liability of the
Social Host for Injuries Caused by the Negligent Acts of Intoxicated Guests, 16 WIL-
LIAMETTE L.J. 561, 563 (1980). See generally 45 AM. JuR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors §§ 561-
614 (1969) (elements of cause of action, defenses).
23. Note, supra note 5, at 449; 19 LAND & WATER L. REV. 285, 286 n.12 (1984).
Other states soon followed suit, and by the turn of the century, most states (including New
Jersey) had enacted a dram shop statute. See McGough, Dram Shop Acts, 1967 A.B.A. SEC.
OF INS. NEGL. & COMPENSATION L., 448, 449-50.
24. Strict liability is liability which attaches regardless of any negligence or evil intent.
It is based on the idea that defendant has taken action or caused a result which society cannot
tolerate. See PROSSER, supra note 20, at ch. 13.
25. See generally 45 Am. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors §§ 561-614 (1969).
26. Note, supra note 6, at 458. See, e.g., Deloach v. Mayer Elec. Supply Co., 378 So.
2d 733 (Ala. 1979) (required showing of "sale"); Kohler v. Wray, 114 Misc. 2d 856, 452
N.Y.S.2d 831 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (dram shop act applied to "unlawfully contributing to the in-
toxication," and liquor laws only applied to commercial operations).
27. 127 III. 231, 20 N.E. 73 (1889).
28. Dram Shop Act of 1874 (R.S. 1874, p. 438 (current version at ILL. ANN. STAT.
Ch. 43, V 135 (West Supp. 1983)). Section 9 of the Act reads, in relevant part, as follows:
Every husband, wife . . . or other person, who shall be injured in person or
property, or means of support by any intoxicated person, or in consequence of
the intoxication, habitual or otherwise, of any person, shall have a right of action
in his or her own name . . . against any person or persons who shall, by selling
thrown from his horse while intoxicated. Defendant Aden had given
Mr. Cruse two drinks which were alleged to have contributed to his
intoxication. In rejecting Mrs. Cruse's claim, the Supreme Court of
Illinois noted that, because the statute was "of a highly penal na-
ture," it must be strictly construed.29 This strict construction led the
court to hold that the dram shop act only applied to those "engaged
in the liquor traffic."3 In a later case, Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass
Co., 31 the Appellate Court of Illinois warned that extending dram
shop liability to social hosts would turn social drinking into a "haz-
ardous act" and "would open up the floodgates of litigation. 32
Those courts willing to give their state's dram shop acts a
broader reach have been promptly overridden by the state legisla-
ture. In Williams v. Klemsrud,33 for example, the Iowa Supreme
Court found the purpose of its state's dram shop act to be remedial
or compensatory in nature, rather than penal.34 Construing the stat-
ute liberally, the court concluded that the dram shop act's grant of a
cause of action against "any person" brought the defendant, a non-
commercial supplier, within its purview.35 Shortly after the Williams
decision, the Iowa Legislature revealed its true intent by repealing
the existing dram shop act and enacting a substitute which permitted
liability to attach only to commercial purveyors of alcohol.30 In Ross
v. Ross,3 7 the Minnesota Supreme Court also gave an expansive
or giving intoxicating liquors, have caused the intoxication, in whole or in part,
of such person or persons ....
29. 127 Ill. at 239, 20 N.E. at 77.
30. Id. The court reached this decision because most of the act applied exclusively to
dram shop owners.
31. 48 II1. App. 2d 412, 199 N.E.2d 300 (1964) (court refused to hold an employees'
association liable under the dram shop act for injuries suffered by plaintiffs in an automobile
accident caused by one of the association's intoxicated members after a company picnic).
32. Id. at 420, 199 N.E.2d at 306. (The court felt that such an extension should be
made by the legislature.); see also Miller v. Moran, 96 11. App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046
(1981) ("whether to provide additional remedies is a legislative rather than a judicial
decision").
33. 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972). In Williams, a twenty-one year-old college student
bought liquor for a minor. The minor drank the alcohol, became intoxicated, and was involved
in a rear-end collision with plaintiff's vehicle. Plaintiff sought recovery under the state's dram
shop act, which read:
Every . . . person who shall be injured in person or property . . . by any intoxi-
cated person . . . shall have a right of action . . against any person who shall,
by selling or giving to another contrary to the provisions of this title any intoxi-
cating liquors, cause the intoxication of such person, for all damages actually
sustained ....
IOWA CODE ANN. § 129.2 (West Supp. 1966) (current version at IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92
(West Supp. 1983)).
34. 197 N.W. 2d at 615-16.
35. Id. at 615.
36. Note, supra note 6, at 457-58. The statute now allows a cause of action "against
any licensee or permittee." IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1983).
37. 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972). Defendant bought liquor for his minor
brother. After drinking it and becoming intoxicated, the minor drove his car off the road and
was killed. Decedent's parents and infant son were awarded damages under Minnesota's dram
reading to its dram shop act,"8 stating that "no reason occurs to us
why those who furnish liquor to others, even on social occasions,
should not be responsible for protecting innocent third parties from
the potential dangers of indiscriminately furnishing such hospital-
ity."'3 9 Yet, as in Williams, this decision was also quickly nullified by
legislative action."'
Although dram shop acts have never directly provided a cause
of action against social hosts, they have contributed to such a cause
of action in two ways: first, they utilized the concept of enterprise
liability to provide compensation to innocent victims of a socially
costly activity;41 second, they aided the establishment of a common-
law cause of action by recognizing the causal link between the fur-
nishing of intoxicating liquor and the injuries caused by an intoxi-
cated recipient of that liquor. Thus, the dram shop acts removed the
most formidable barrier to the successful raising of a common law
negligence action against a purveyor of intoxicating liquor. 2 Such a
cause of action was finally successfully raised in the landmark case
of Rappaport v. Nichols. 3
In Rappaport, the New Jersey Supreme Court was confronted
with the issue of whether to allow recovery against a tavern owner
who sold liquor to an intoxicated minor in violation of an alcoholic
beverage control statute. 4 The court noted that prior common law
claims had been rejected by other courts for proximate cause rea-
shop act.
38. At the time of the Ross case, the dram shop act provided a cause of action "against
any person who, by illegally selling, bartering, or giving intoxicating liquors .... MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West 1972) (emphasis supplied) (current version at MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 340.95 (West Supp. 1983)).
39. 294 Minn. at 121-22, 200 N.W.2d at 153 (footnote omitted).
40. Note, supra note 6, at 457 n.15. The legislature deleted the word "giving." See
supra note 37.
41. See Comment, supra note 6, at 363-64. Enterprise liability is the theory that busi-
nesses which market products which cause injury should be held liable for injuries caused by
the products because those costs can be distributed among their customers as a cost of doing
business. The cost of the injuries will thus be internalized into the price of the product. Com-
ment, Torts: Liability of the Social Purveyor, 28 OKLA. L. REv. 204, 206 n.14 (citing Escola
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J. concurring);
see also Village of Brooten v. Cudahy Packing Co., 291 F.2d 284, 301 (8th Cir. 1961).
42. See Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 196, 156 A.2d I, 5 (1959); see also Man-
ning v. Yokas, 389 Pa. 136, 132 A.2d 198 (1957).
43. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959). Rappaport was the first case in which civil liabil-
ity for a third person's injuries was imposed on a tavern owner in the absence of a dram shop
act. Note, supra note 6 at 401. See also Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dep't. Store, 269 F.2d 322
(7th Cir. 1959); Comment, supra note 6 at 358 n.19.
44. 31 N.J. at 194, 156 A.2d at 4. Nichols, a minor, was served alcoholic beverages at
the defendants' taverns. He became intoxicated, drove his mother's car, and collided with
plaintiff's car. Plaintiff's husband was killed in the accident. New Jersey had no dram shop
act, but it did have a statute forbidding the sale of alcoholic beverages to minors or visibly
intoxicated persons. The Law Division granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
See supra note 12.
sons,4 5 but then pointed out that the objection had been weakened by
the reasoning of cases decided under dram shop acts.46 After subject-
ing the case to a conventional negligence analysis, 4 7 the court held
that the defendant's conduct could readily be found to have been
negligent,48 and that the proximate cause issue was a jury question.49
In reaching its conclusion, the court relied upon analagous common
law negligence cases5" and weighed relevant policy considerations
5'
such as the current problem of drunk driving.52 Other jurisdictions
quickly adopted the holding and reasoning of Rappaport by allowing
civil liability against liquor vendors who violated alcoholic beverage
control laws.5"
Once a common law cause of action was recognized against tav-
ern owners, 54 it remained to be seen whether the cause of action
would be extended to social hosts. The New Jersey Superior Court,
Appellate Division, made this extension in Linn v. Rand,55 in which
it held that a social host who served intoxicating liquor to a minor
could be held liable for injuries to third persons caused by the mi-
nor's subsequent negligent acts.56 Judge Halpern, writing for the
45. 31 N.J. at 196, 156 A.2d at 5. See supra note 20, and authority cited therein.
46. See supra note 41.
47. See 31 N.J. at 201, 156 A.2d at 8 ("Negligence is tested by whether the reasonably
prudent person at the time and place should recognize and foresee an unreasonable risk or
likelihood of harm or danger to others.").
48. Id. at 202-03, 156 A.2d at 8 (holding that the statute and regulations were for the
protection of the general public, the court remarked: "In view of the standard of conduct
prescribed by the statute and the regulations, a tavern keeper's sale of alcoholic beverages
when he knows or should know that the patron is a minor or is intoxicated may readily be
found by the jury to be imprudent conduct."). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 286
(1965) (provides that a penal statute may be adopted as the standard of reasonable conduct if
its purpose is to protect the same class of people as the plaintiff and it protects the same
interest from the same harm arising from the same hazard).
49. 31 N.J. at 202-03, 156 A.2d at 9. Thus, they could not sustain the granting of the
motion for summary judgment. Id. See also supra note 12.
50. 31 N.J. at 199-200, 156 A.2d at 7 (citing cases involving negligent entrustment of
firearms and cases where violation of a "public safety measure" was held to be evidence of
negligence).
51. Id. at 205-06, 156 A.2d at 10 (burden to defendant, compensation to innocent vic-
tims, strengthening the rule of law).
52. Id. at 202, 156 A.2d at 8-9.
53. See Vesely v. Sager, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 486 P.2d 151 (1971); Prevatt v. McClen-
nan, 201 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217 N.E.2d 847
(1966); Pike v. George, 434 S.W.2d 626 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968); Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc.,
353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968); Berkely v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290
(Sup. Ct. 1965); Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d 755 (1965).
54. In Soronen v. Olde Milford Inn, Inc., 46 N.J. 582, 218 A.2d 630 (1966), the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey extended the Rappaport rationale to cover service by commercial
vendors of intoxicated adults. The court also held that contributory negligence was not a de-
fense to the cause of action. Id. at 591, 218 A.2d at 635.
55. 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (App. Div. 1976). In Linn, Lucy Rand, a minor,
was served alcoholic beverages by Thomas Nacnodovitz while a guest at his home. She became
intoxicated and was allowed to drive away. She subsequently ran down and seriously injured
plaintiff's infant son. Id. Nacnodovitz moved for summary judgment, which was granted by
the trial judge. Id. at 215, 356 A.2d at 16-17. See supra note 12.
56. Id. at 220, 356 A.2d at 19. The Appellate Court of California had reached this
court, utilized the same negligence test, that was used in Rappaport
and recognized the cause of action even though no liquor control
statute was at issue.57 The opinion focused on the inconsistency of
allowing social hosts immunity from liability when, under Rap-
paport, commercial vendors were subject to liability for the same
culpable conduct.58 The court further noted the past willingness of
New Jersey courts to strike down anomalous tort immunities59 and
impose legal duties where justice demanded. Judge Halpern de-
clared: "[O]ur goal is to do substantial justice in light of our modern
day life."" ° Mindful of the serious societal problem created by drunk
driving, the court reasoned that imposition of liability was justified.6
Although the issue had not reached the New Jersey Supreme
Court prior to Kelly v. Gwinnell,62 one New Jersey trial court in
Figuly v. Knoll,"' applied the Linn holding to impose liability on a
social host for serving a visibly intoxicated adult."
Other jurisdictions are divided in their treatment of social host
liability. 5 In cases concerning service by a social host of a minor in
violation of an alcoholic beverage control statute, the trend appears
to be towards imposing liability. 6 Only two jurisdictions, however,
decision four years earlier in Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100
(1972) in which a minor had been served alcohol by his employer in violation of a statute.
57. 140 N.J. Super. at 216-17, 356 A.2d at 18. The court noted that Rand's age had
not been established in the record and that the trial judge had granted the summary judgment
anyway. Id. The court stated the elements of the cause of action as follows:
[Plaintiff must] prove that (a) Rand was a minor, (b) Nacnodovitz knew she
was a minor, knew she intended to drive her car and nevertheless served her
alcoholic beverages to the degree that she was unfit to drive, and (c) it was
reasonably foreseeable that Rand might injure herself, or others, and that his
negligence was a proximate cause of the accident and plaintiff's injuries.
140 N.J. Super. at 217, 356 A.2d at 18.
58. "It makes little sense to say that the licensee in Rappaport is under a duty to
exercise care, but give immunity to a social host who may be guilty of the same wrongful
conduct. ... 140 N.J. Super. at 217, 356 A.2d at 18.
59. Id. at 218-19, 356 A.2d at 19 (sovereign immunity, charitable immunity, parental
immunity, inter-spousal immunity).
60. Id. at 218, 356 A.2d at 18-19.
61. Id. at 219, 356 A.2d at 19. The court, however, stressed that their holding was
strictly limited to the facts of the case, and that they would make future determinations on a
case by case basis. Id.
62. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
63. 185 N.J. Super. 477, 449 A.2d 564 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982).
64. Id. at 580, 449 A.2d at 565. In Figuly, Defendant Longfield, a former bartender,
served Knoll, whom he characterized as an alcoholic, twelve drinks of vodka and tonic at an
afternoon party. Knoll was subsequently involved in a motor vehicle accident in which plaintiff
was injured. Longfield-moved for a summary judgment. The court denied the motion, aserting
that Rappaport should be extended to social hosts and that there was nothing in Linn to pre-
vent that extension. Id.
65. Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., - Pa .... 470 A.2d 515, 517 (1983).
66. Note, supra note 6, at 468; see Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., - Pa...
__, 470 A.2d 515, 518 (1983) ("an actor's negligence exists in furnishing intoxicants to a
class of persons legislatively determined to be incompetent to handle its effects."); see also
Burke v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. App. 3d 570, 181 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1982); Brattain v. Her-
ron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1974); Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611, 213
N.W.2d 820 (1973). But see Cory v. Schierloh, 174 Cal. Rptr. 500, 629 P.2d 8 (1981); Bald-
have imposed liability on social hosts who furnish intoxicating liquor
to visibly intoxicated adult guests, but both of these decisions have
been limited by subsequent legislative enactments. In Wiener v.
Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity,7 the Su-
preme Court of Oregon allowed a common law cause of action in
negligence to lie against a fraternity which had served alcohol to a
minor.6 8 The court found that the fraternity had behaved negligently
because it knew that the guest was a minor, and realized that he had
driven to the party and would have to drive home. 9 The court ruled
that the fraternity had a "duty ...to refuse to serve alcohol to a
guest when it would be unreasonable under the circumstances to per-
mit him to drink."7 The court implied that a similar holding would
result when hosts served drinks to visibly intoxicated adult guests71
but explained that it would not make such a ruling until the facts
presented themselves.72 In 1979, before the case law could develop
further, the Oregon legislature passed legislation which limited the
Wiener holding.
73
In California, social host liability has put the legislature and the
courts somewhat at odds.74 In Coulter v. Superior Court,7 5 the Su-
preme Court of California held that a host who furnished alcohol to
a visibly intoxicated adult under circumstances which created a fore-
seeable risk of harm to others could be liable under a common law
negligence theory.7 ' The impact of the decision was short lived, how-
win v. Zoradi, 123 Cal. App. 275, 176 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1981); Keating v. Kroger, 143 Ga.
App. 23, 237 S.E.2d 443 (1977).
67. 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971). In Wiener, a college fraternity allowed large
quantities of alcohol to be served to a minor guest. The plaintiff, a passenger in the minor's
car, was injured when he drove into a building on his way home from the party. Id.
68. Id. at 638, 485 P.2d at 23.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 636, 485 P.2d at 21 ("Such persons could include those already severely
intoxicated .... ").
72. Id.
73. Note, supra note 6, at 472. The Oregon Legislature passed OR. REV. STAT. §§
30.955, .960 (1983). OR. REV. STAT. § 30.955 (1983) provides as follows: "No private host is
liable for damages incurred or caused by an intoxicated social guest unless the private host has
served or provided alcoholic beverages to a social guest when such guest was visibly intoxi-
cated." OR. REV. STAT. § 30.960 (1983) provides as follows:
[N]o licensee, permittee, or social host shall be liable to third persons injured by
or through persons not having reached 21 years of age who obtained alcoholic
beverages from the licensee, permittee or social host unless it is demonstrated
that a reasonable person would have determined that identification should have
been requested or that the identification exhibited was altered or did not accu-
rately describe the person to whom the alcoholic liquor was sold or served.
74. See Note, supra note 6, at 468.
75. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669 (1978). In Coulter, a woman was served large quan-
tities of alcohol by her corporate landlord at a tenant party. She became intoxicated and sub-
sequently drove her car off the road, striking a road abutment and injuring plaintiff, her pas-
senger. Id. at 148-49, 577 P.2d at 671.
76. See supra note 75.
ever, for just months after it was handed down the California Legis-
lature specifically nullified the result and stipulated that prior case
law was top control.17 The old common law rule that was revived
simply states that no cause of action exists for furnishing liquor to an
"ordinary man. '"78
Despite the clear legislative intent to limit liability, California
courts continued to search for a reason to allow recovery. 79 In Can-
tor v. Anderson,s0 a California appellate court held that liability
could be imposed on a social guest who knowingly furnished liquor
to a person who, because of an exceptional physical or mental condi-
tion, would pose a risk to others if he consumed the liquor."1 In Har-
ris v. Trojan Fireworks Co.,"* another California appellate court
held an employer liable for injuries caused by the drunken driving of
an employee returning home from the company Christmas party.
Under the peculiar facts of the case, the court found a sufficient
nexus between the party and the employer-employee relationship to
frame a cause of action under a respondeat superior theory.8 3 Thus,
77. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602 (West Supp. 1984) provides as follows:
(a) Every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or
given away, any alcoholic beverage to any habitual or common drunkard or to
any obviously intoxicated person is guilty of a misdemeanor.(b) No person ...
[who violates subdivision (a)] shall be civilly liable to any injured person or the
estate of such person for injuries inflicted on that person as a result of intoxica-
tion by the consumer of such alcoholic beverage.(c) The Legislature hereby de-
clares that this section shall be interpreted so that the holdings in cases such as
Vesely v. Sager, Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, and Coulter v. Superior Court be
abrogated in favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the consumption of
alcoholic beverages as the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by
an intoxicated person.
Id. (citations omitted). But see CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25602:1 (West Supp. 1984) ("[A]
cause of action may be brought by or on behalf of any person who has suffered injury or death
against any person licensed ...who sells, furnishes, gives or causes to be sold, furnished, or
given away any alcoholic beverage to any obviously intoxicated minor. ... )
78. See Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955) (states the old common law
"consumption rule").
79. Note, supra note 6, at 474. Accord Blarney v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884 (Minn.
1978) cert. denied 444 U.S. 1070 (1980) (allowed common law action where dram shop act
did not apply to out-of-state supplier); Trail v. Christian, 298 Minn. 101, 213 N.W.2d 618
(1978) (allowed common law action where sale of "3.2 beer" was not covered by dram shop
act).
80. 126 Cal. App. 3d 124, 178 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1981). Cantor involved a plaintiff who
maintained a home for the developmentally disabled. Her neighbor served alcoholic beverages
to one of her disabled residents with full knowledge of his disability. The resident became
uncontrollably violent and assaulted plaintiff, causing her severe injury.
81. Id. at 125, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 542. Defendant relied on Section 25602, see supra
note 77, claiming that the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury was not the furnishing of the
alcohol, but its consumption. Id. The court noted that the common law rule was limited to the
furnishing of liquor to an ordinary man. Id. at 130, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 544; see supra note 6
(discussing exceptions to the common law rule). Noting that foreseeability is an element of a
proximate cause/duty analysis, the court held that if plaintiff could prove that defendant
should have foreseen the effect the alcohol would have had on the resident, she would have a
cause of action. 126 Cal. App. 3d at 131, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 545; see also PROSSER supra note
6, § 43, at 257-58 (4th ed. 1971).
82. 120 Cal. App. 3d 157, 174 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1981).
83. Id. at 163, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 456. Under respondeat superior, an employer is re-
although legislatures have acted to limit liability, courts continue to
attempt to impose it where they feel such imposition is just. 4
Doing "substantial justice"85 was the prevelant concern of the
Supreme Court of New Jersey" in Kelly v. Gwinnell8 7 The court
found the basic elements of a negligence cause of action,8" but stated
that something "more [was] needed;" "more being the value judg-
ment, based on an analysis of public policy, that the actor owed the
injured party a duty of reasonable care."8 9 In deciding whether to
impose that duty, the court focused on two issues: the fairness of
imposing liability on social hosts;90 and the appropriateness of such
liability being imposed by the courts instead of the legislature.91 The
court identified policy goals it thought important in resolving this
issue, such as the adequate compensation of innocent victims of
drunken driving 92 and the reduction of the incidence of drunken
driving on New Jersey's highways.93
Chief Justice Wilentz, writing for the majority, cited with ap-
proval the Appellate Division's holding in Linn and reemphasized the
concern generated by the inconsistency in immunizing social hosts
while imposing liability on licensees.9 " Focusing on the plight of the
accident victim, the Chief Justice refused to acknowledge any dis-
tinction between social hosts and licensees. 5 The emotionally
charged opinion stressed the tremendous social cost of drunk driving
and reasoned that the need to provide compensation for its innocent
victims outweighed any dislocation in social habits or any threat of
disproportionate financial loss to social hosts. While admitting that a
social host may be less culpable than an intoxicated adult guest, the
sponsible for damages due to his servant's want of care if the servant's act occurs in the course
of his employment. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1179 (5th ed. 1979).
84. See supra notes 73 and 79 and authority cited therein.
85. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
86. The court was composed of Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Clifford, Schreiber,
Handler, Pollock, O'Hern, and Garibaldi. Chief Justice Wilentz wrote the opinion, and Justice
Garibaldi filed a dissenting opinion.
87. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1019 (1984).
88. Id. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222 ("the usual elements of a cause of action for negli-
gence are clearly present: an action by defendant creating an unreasonable risk of harm to
plaintiff, a risk that was clearly foreseeable, and a risk that resulted in an injury equally fore-
seeable."). See generally PROSSER, supra note 6, at § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
89. 96 N.J. at 544, 476 A.2d at 1222.
90. Id.
91. id. at 552-53, 476 A.2d at 1226.
92. Id. at 551, 476 A.2d at 1226.
93. Id. at 544-45, 476 A.2d at 1222.
94. Id. at 547, 476 A.2d at 1223-24.
95. Id. at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224. Accord Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d at 154,
577 P.2d at 674. ("[Ilt is small comfort to the widow whose husband has been killed in an
accident involving an intoxicated driver to learn that the driver received his drinks from a
hospitable social host rather than by purchase at a bar.) But cf. Sites v. Nee, - Pa. Super.
- 477 A.2d 547 (Pa. Super. 1984) ("We do not reach here the question whether liability
should be imposed on a defendant who becomes something more than a social host . . .).
Chief Justice stressed that hosts are not faultless, 6 and trial courts
could apportion financial responsibility between the host and his
guest.9 7
In her well-reasoned dissenting opinion, Justice Garibaldi em-
phasized the practical differences between social hosts and licensees.
The commercial bartender is better qualified to discern intoxication
among his customers, and better equipped to deal with dangerously
intoxicated people. 98 In contrast, the social host has little expertise in
this area, and his disadvantage is compounded by the awkwardness
of regulating the alcohol intake of a friend, co-worker, or supervisor.
Justice Garibaldi also stressed the superior ability of commercial
vendors to spread risks. She noted that while the majority assumed
that social hosts could procure liability insurance, it offered no proof
that such insurance was readily available or economically feasible.99
Moreover, the legislature had already provided adequate means of
compensation for the victims of accidents caused by drunk drivers.' 0
In a final argument, the dissent asserted that the legislature was
the appropriate body to make a public policy decision with such bur-
densome and far-reaching consequences.' Justice Garibaldi argued
that the majority had given insufficient consideration to the ramifica-
tions of its decision and that, given time, a more creative remedy
could be fashioned by the legislature.0 2 She also noted the large vol-
ume of recent legislative enactments in this area, 1 3 theorizing that if
the legislature had intended to act on the issue of social host liabil-
ity, it would have done so. Responding to this criticism, the majority
interpreted the legislative activity as the enunciation of a policy of
96. 96 N.J. at 549-50, 476 A.2d at 1225. The Chief Justice drew an analogy to a
person who negligently lends his car to an intoxicated person. This is a popular analogy in
social host liability cases. See, e.g., Linn v. Rand, 140 N.J. 212, 219, 356 A.2d 15, 19 (App.
Div. 1976).
97. Id at 548, 476 A.2d at 1224. The Chief Justice also noted that hosts could procure
liability insurance. See also 9 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 784, 793 (1982) (discussing Ono v. Apple-
gate, 612 P.2d 533 (Hawaii 1980), where the cause of an accident was ruled to be 25% for
negligently providing alcohol and 75% for negligent driving).
98. 96 N.J. 565-66, 476 A.2d at 1233-34.
99. Id. at 568, 476 A.2d at 1234-35; But see Note, Extension of the Dram Shop Act:
New Found Liability of the Social Host, 49 N.D.L. REv. 67, 81 n. 74 (informal survey show-
ing that increasing coverage of homeowner's or renter's policy would be inexpensive).
100. 96 N.J. 564, 476 A.2d at 1232-33. Payment would initially be expected to come
from the drunk driver's insurance. If he was uninsured, payment would come from the individ-
ual's own policy which is required by law to include uninsured motorist coverage, see N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-14 (West 1973). If the victim was a pedestrian and could not recover
from the driver's insurance, they could recover from the Unsatisfied Claims and Judgments
Fund, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-72. The only time that there might be no recovery is when
the victim himself is illegally driving without insurance.
101. 96 N.J. at 560, 476 A.2d at 1230.
102. Id. at 569, 476 A.2d at 1235.
103. Id. See, e.g., 1983 N.J. SEss. LAW 574 (West) (imposing fine and one year loss of
driver's license for minor attempting to buy liquor and for anyone supplying minor with false
identification); Id. at 39 (four month mandatory minimum sentence for conviction of "death
by auto" while driving under the influence).
deterrence of drunk driving, concluding that the court's decision
would further that policy.' The majority noted that determination
of the scope of duty in negligence cases was a proper judicial func-
tion, and that if the legislature disagreed with the court's decision, it
could take remedial action."0 5
The New Jersey Legislature has initiated such remedial action
with the recent introduction of Assembly Bill 43.16 Thus, it appears
that the Kelly case will soon join Williams, Ross, and Coulter in the
ranks of legislatively abrogated case law.'0 7 Although courts nor-
mally impose duties in tort cases, the imposition of a duty whose
discharge is so onerous is more properly the function of an innovative
and representative legislature. Although a primary goal of tort law is
to provide compensation for innocent victims,'08 obtaining such com-
pensation from social hosts would require that such hosts be sub-
jected to a standard which would approach strict liability in the
hands of a jury - a result both unnecessary and unjust. It is unnec-
essary because of the legislature's capacity to fashion alternate
means of providing adequate compensation for victims. It is unjust
because of the limited control a social host has over his guests' con-
sumption of alcohol and their subsequent actions. Most likely, deci-
sions like Kelly which arise in the future will also suffer legislative
abrogation. And it seems equally likely that legislative action in this
area will remain vigorous.
104. 96 N.J. at 544-45, 476 A.2d at 1222.
105. Id. at 555, 476 A.2d at 1227.
106. A. 43, 201st. Leg., Ist Sess. (1984). The bill reads in relevant part, as follows:
No person, other than a person licensed . . . to sell alcoholic beverages, who
furnishes any alcoholic beverages, to a person at or over the age at which a
person is authorized to purchase and consume alcoholic beverages shall be civilly
liable to any person or the estate of any person for personal injuries or property
damage inflicted as a result of intoxication by the consumer of the alcoholic
beverages.
107. See supra notes 32-39, 72-78 and accompanying text.
108. See PROSSER supra note 6, at § I (functions of tort law).
[Casenote by Stephen R. Thelin].
CONTRACTS - INSURANCE LAW - CLEARLY WORDED AND
CONSPICUOUSLY DISPLAYED EXCLUSIONS IN AN INSURANCE
CONTRACT CANNOT BE AVOIDED DESPITE INSURED'S LACK OF
KNOWLEDGE OR UNDERSTANDING. Standard Venetian Blind
Co. v. American Empire Insurance Co., 503 Pa. 300, 469 A.2d
563 (1983).
In Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Insurance
Co.,1 a divided2 Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that clearly
worded and conspicuously displayed 3 exclusion clauses in an insur-
ance contract cannot be avoided by an insured who lacks knowledge
or understanding of the exclusion clauses. The court explicitly re-
jected the interpretive standard that had been applied in a line of
Pennsylvania cases since 1974, which enforced the exclusions only
after the insurer proved that the exclusions and their effect had been
explained to the insured.4 The majority also declined to adopt the
"reasonable expectations" standard5 used in other jurisdictions.
Rather, the court's opinion evinced that traditional contract princi-
ples should be employed to determine the parties' rights and obliga-
tions under an insurance contract.
A complaint filed against the Standard Venetian Blind Com-
pany precipitated' the company's controversy with its insurer. The
complaint, filed by D.H. Evans, alleged that Standard Venetian
Blind, a general contractor, breached express and implied warran-
ties7 under a construction contract. The contract provided that a
subcontractor of Standard Venetian Blind would install a portico on
Evans' property. The portico was completed in 1974, but four years
later a heavy snowstorm caused it to collapse. The portico was de-
1. 503 Pa. 300, 469 A.2d 563 (1983).
2. Chief Justice (now Justice) Roberts delivered the opinion of the court, and was
joined by Justices Larsen, McDermott, and Zappala. Justice Hutchinson wrote a concurring
opinion in which Justice Flaherty joined. Justice (now Chief Justice) Nix wrote a brief dissent.
3. See injia notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
6. In Pennsylvania, an insurer's duty to defend coverage afforded by a policy arises
when a complaint filed against the insured alleges liability that would potentially be covered
under the insurance policy. Gedeon v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 410 Pa. 55, 188 A.2d
320 (1963).
7. Evans alleged that Standard Venetian Blind warranted that the portico "would not
collapse under weights of snow or ice far beyond those seen in the Wilkes-Barre area." 503 Pa.
at 310, 469 A.2d at 568 (Hutchinson, J., concurring).
molished and Evans incurred, in addition to the cost of replacing the
portico, the consequential expenses of repairing property stored be-
neath the portico and clearing away the debris.'
Standard Venetian Blind was insured by the American Empire
Insurance Company under a comprehensive general liability policy9
issued in 1975. The policy provided personal injury and property
damage coverage, committing the insurer to indemnify the insured
for those sums for which the policyholder became legally obligated,
and requiring the insurer to defend property damage. American Em-
pire Insurance conceded coverage for the consequential damages as-
sumed by Evans, however, the insurer refused to defend or to indem-
nify Standard Venetian Blind in connection with Evans' claim for
the sum of money needed to replace the portico itself.1" The denial of
coverage was based on two provisions11 included in a list of exclu-
sions that followed the coverage section of the policy.
While the breach of warranty claim filed by Evans was awaiting
trial,12 Standard Venetian Blind initiated a declaratory judgment ac-
tion13 seeking a determination that its liability to Evans was covered
by the policy. Depositions and testimony emanating from the declar-
atory judgment action revealed that the insurance contract had been
executed by Sheldon B. Morris, one of Standard Venetian Blind's
partners, and Boris H. Levitsky, an employee of Block Brothers In-
surance Company acting as agent for American Empire Insurance.
Morris asserted that he relied on Block Brothers Insurance to pro-
8. 503 Pa. at 302, 469 A.2d at 565.
9. 503 Pa. at 310, 469 A.2d at 568 (Hutchinson, J., concurring).
Insurance policies are normally standardized policies generated by industry trade groups.
See infra note 35. For a reproduction of the 1966 version of the Comprehensive General Lia-
bility Policy prepared by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters, see Elliott, The New
Comprehensive General Liability Policy in LIABILITY INSURANCE DISPUTES 12-1, 12-33 to 12-
36 (S. Schreiber ed. 1968). This version was slightly modified in 1973. See 2 R. LONG, THE
LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 11.01 (1979).
10. 503 Pa. at 304, 469 A.2d at 565.
II. The following provisions formed the basis for denying coverage:
This insurance does not apply: . . .
(n) to property damage to the named insured's products arising out of such
products;
(o) to property damage to work performed by or on behalf of the named in-
sured arising out of the work or any portion thereof or out of materials,
parts or equipment furnished in connection therewith.
The policy defined the phrase "named insured's products" as "goods or products manufac-
tured, sold, handled, or distributed by the named insured or others trading under his name.
.Id. at 303, 469 A.2d at 565 (quoting from the policy).
12. The outcome of Evans' suit was a jury verdict against Standard Venetian Blind in
the amount of $13,094.64, which reflected compensation for replacing the portico and for Ev-
ans' consequential damages. 503 Pa. at 309, 469 A.2d at 568 (Hutchinson, J., concurring).
The judgment entered by the trial court was affirmed in Evans v. Standard Venetian Blind
Co., 295 Pa. Super. 576, 435 A.2d 926 (1981).
13. Declaratory judgments are permitted in Pennsylvania under 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 7531-41 (Purdon 1982).
vide "full coverage for everything we have,'" 4 which included "fire
insurance, our products liability, our contingent liability and all of
the items that go into making up these policies."'" Morris testified
that he had received the policy, but that he had filed it away without
ever reading it.'
6
The trial court found that the policy exclusions were "plain and
free of ambiguity' '1 7 and, if enforced, would exclude from coverage
the insured's liability for the damage to the portico itself. Neverthe-
less, the court, relying on a line of cases following the 1974 Superior
Court decision of Hionis v. Northern Mutual Insurance Co.,i8 re-
fused to apply the exclusions since American Empire Insurance was
unable to prove that the insured had an awareness and understand-
ing of the exclusions. The Superior Court affirmed, also applying the
Hionis standard. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court inter-
preted the policy using traditional contract law, reversed the Supe-
rior Court, and directed that judgment be entered for the insurer.' 9
Contract law, the standards around which individuals are able
to legislate the rules governing their relationships,2" emerged in its
classical form following the Industrial Revolution and the develop-
ment of market economies.2 Fundamental to the new law was the
premise that a contract is a private transaction between individuals
who meet by chance in the marketplace and bargain on equal foot-
ing.22 As a result, the government was expected to - and did -
refrain from restraining or interfering" in contractual relationships.
The courts, however, were called on to interpret and to enforce these
14. 503 Pa. at 304, 469 A.2d at 565 (quoting from the trial record).
15. 503 Pa. at 312, 469 A.2d at 570 (Hutchinson, J., concurring) (quoting from the
trial record).
16. 503 Pa. at 303, 469 A.2d 565.
17. Id.
18. 230 Pa. Super. 511, 327 A.2d 363 (1974); see also infra notes 55-64 and accompa-
nying text.
19. 503 Pa. at 307, 469 A.2d at 567.
20. See generally Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Law-
making Power, 84 HARV. L, REV. 529 (1971).
21. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
In Holmes, A Contextual Study of Commercial Good Faith: Good Faith Disclosure in
Contract Formation, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 381 (1978), the author pinpoints the beginning of
the scientific formality of contract law at 1871, the year in which Langdell published the first
casebook on contracts, The fundamental principles embodied in this casebook were followed by
the works of Holmes and Williston, which further developed the pure doctrine while viewing
narrowly the social duties of the parties. But see Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of
Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1974); Horwitz, Book Review, 42 U. CHI. L.
REV. 787 (1975) (reviewing G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974)).
22. Farnsworth, The Past of Promise: An Historical Introduction to Contract, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 576 (1969); Kessler, supra note 21 at 630.
23. The high water mark for freedom of contract proponents may have been reached
during the era of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), Adair v. United States, 208 U.S.
161 (1908), and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). These decisions elevated freedom of
contract to a property right constitutionally protected from governmental interference.
agreements. The necessity for predictability of rights and obligations
in the new economy led to the evolution of scientific-legal princi-
pleS2 4 that focused on defects in contract formation,2 5 which tended
to simplify the interpretive process. Three examples of these judi-
cially-contrived rules are: the contra proferentem rule, a rule
designed to resolve ambiguities in language,26 the doctrine that clear
and unambiguous language does not give rise to an "opportunity for
interpretation or construction, ' 27 and the principle that a party has a
duty to read a contract before assenting to it.2"
The disparities between an insurance contract and a contract
formed in the manner contemplated by the laissez flare capitalists
have long been acknowledged.2 9 The primary difference 30 is that an
24. The development of discrete rules may have been more than a practical necessity.
The Classical Individualism philosophy, which was most influential between 1850 and 1940,
has been reduced to three basic propositions:
[I.] [T]here should exist an area of individual autonomy within which there is
no responsibility at all for effects on others. . . . [2] [T]here are only two legiti-
mate sources of liability: fault ... and contract. ... [31 [T~he concepts of
fault and free will to contract can generate, through a process of deduction, de-
terminate legal rules defining the boundaries and content of tort and contract
duties.
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1728-29
(1976) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
25. Comment, Unconscionability in Standard Form, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 (1976).
26. The following is a restatement of the contra proferentem rule: "Since one who
speaks or writes, can by exactness of expression more easily prevent mistakes in meaning, than
the one with whom he is dealing, doubts arising from ambiguity of language are resolved in
favor of the latter." 4 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACT § 621, at 760-61
(3d ed. 1961) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). Since the rule deals with ambiguity ex-
isting at the time of assent, it addresses a defect in formation.
In an insurance context, the rule has been stated as "the familiar principle that insurance
policies be strictly construed against the insurer, and that ambiguities and doubts and equivo-
cal words be construed against the insurer and be resolved in the insured's favor." Mohan v.
Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 207 Pa. Super. 205, 216 A.2d 342, 347 (1966), ajfg per curiam
38 Pa. D. & C.2d 401, 410 (1965).
Pennsylvania cases applying the rule early this century include MacDonald v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 304 Pa. 213, 155 A. 491 (1931); Brams v. New York Life Ins. Co., 299 Pa.
I1, 148 A. 855 (1930); Francis v. Prudential Ins. Co., 243 Pa. 380, 90 A. 205 (1914).
The meaning of the term "ambiguity" is clearly consequential. See infra note 73.
27. 4 S. WILLISTON, supra note 26, § 609, at 402.
28. Johnson v. Patterson, 114 Pa. 398, 6 A. 746 (1886); see also I S. WILLISTON,
supra note 26, § 35.
For an analysis of the competing policy considerations which circumscribe the bounds of
the duty to read, and application of the analysis to the unauthorized use of a credit card, see
Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read - Business Run by IBM Machine, the
Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1966).
29. Consider this excerpt from an 1878 opinion:
Insurance contracts are prepared by insurers who have at their command in
their preparation the best legal talent and business capacity, and every precau-
tion is taken for their protection. This is made necessary to prevent the frauds of
bad men. But on the other hand the insured are generally plain men without
counsel, or the capacity to understand the involved and complicated writings
which they are required to sign, and which in most cases probably they never
read. What they understand is that they are to pay the insurers so much money,
and if they are burnt out the insurers pay them so much.
Willis v. Germania & Hanover Fire Ins. Cos., 79 N.C. 218, 220-21 (1878).
30. Holmes notes two other unique qualities of insurance contracts. First, an insured's
insurance contract is a contract of adhesion, 31 as a result of the way
it is prepared and marketed. Unlike an ordinary contract, the insur-
ance contract is formed by parties whose relative bargaining power
and knowledge are disproportionate,32 written in language that is ex-
traordinarily technical from the insured's point of view, 33 often deliv-
ered to the insured as a completed policy only after contract forma-
tion, 34 and standardized, so that the insured has little choice of terms
or language.3 5 The need for control resulting from abuses by insur-
ers36 led to the development of "rights against insurers at variance
with policy provisions. ' 37 These controls comprised legislative38 ac-
tion and judicial interpretation that favored the insured. Despite this
preference for the insured, early twentieth century courts were reluc-
tant to openly admit that their decisions were at variance with the
policy language, preferring to cast their decisions within the discrete
rules of classical contract theory.39 For example, in order to apply
potential economic harm is greater than that of a party to a general contract. In the event of
an unexpiated breach, the insured's fortuitous loss is compounded by his loss of expectation
(coverage) and premiums, but a party to an ordinary contract would expect to lose at most his
expectation interest. Second, four competing interests (those of the insured, the insurer, other
policyholders, and the public in general) must be considered, as compared with the two inter-
ests treated by the classical contract theorists. Holmes, supra note 21, at 396.
31. The term "contract of adhesion" referring to an agreement in which one party has
little choice of terms, was coined in Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33
HARV. L. REV. 198, 222 (1919).
32. Holmes, supra note 21, at 397; Kessler, supra note 21, at 632.
33. Holmes, supra note 21, at 397; Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire
Ins. Co., 503 Pa. 300, 313, 469 A.2d 563, 570 (Hutchinson, J., concurring) ("Such policies are
ordinarily 'clear' and 'unambiguous,' if at all, only to underwriters, statisticians or actuaries
who have expert knowledge in the evaluation and classification of risks.").
Herbert Denenberg, Pennsylvania's former consumer-minded Insurance Commissioner,
applied readability tests to insurance contracts and other writings. On a scale ranging to 100,
with 100 corresponding to perfect readability, Denenberg reported the following scores: Joe
Garagiola's book, "Baseball is a Funny Game," scored an 80, a revised edition of the Bible
was rated at 67, a version of Einstein's Theory of Relativity achieved 18, and various insurance
contracts ranged between ten and minus two. O'Connell, Living with Life Insurance, N.Y.
Times, May 19, 1974, § 6 (Magazine), at 34 (also cited at Holmes, supra note 21, at 397
n.67).
34. Holmes, supra note 21, at 397; Slawson, supra note 20, at 545.
35. Insurance policies are standardized intercompany as well as intracompany. Stan-
dardized insurance policy provisions are periodically adopted by the National Bureau of Casu-
alty Underwriters for use by the insurance companies that comprise its membership. Nonmem-
ber insurers often use the same policy provisions. Elliott, supra note 9, at 12-3.
Standardization should not be viewed as completely contrary to the interests of the policy-
holder and the public. Since they facilitate accurate bulk calculation of risk by pooling the
experience of many companies, standardized contracts promote predictability and add effi-
ciency to the insuring process. The insurance companies' efficiency is transferred to the con-
sumer as lower premiums. R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAW § 2.10 (1971).
36. R. KEETON, supra note 35, § 6.2.
37. Id. at 348.
38. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 477b (Purdon Supp. 1984-1985), which pro-
vides that policy provisions must be approved by the Insurance Commissioner in order for the
provisions to be lawfully used in Pennsylvania. Unapproved language in a policy would not be
given effect.
39. Holmes, supra note 21, at 398.
[C]ourts have made great efforts to protect the weaker contracting party and
the contra proferentem rule,' judges strained to find ambiguity in
apparently straightforward provisions of insurance contracts. 1
Courts began to accept more openly a "legal realism "42 ap-
proach to the interpretation of insurance contracts in the early
1960's.43 Rather than employing traditional contract interpretive
techniques, some courts applied new and unique doctrines and prin-
ciples. 44 Professor Keeton described the most important and influen-
tial of these doctrines: "The objectively reasonable expectations of
applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insur-
ance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the
policy provisions would have negated those expectations."' 5 This doc-
trine of reasonable expectations has been accepted46 in its purest
form"7 only in Alaska 4  and New Jersey.' 9 Courts in other states
have used the doctrine, but only after finding an ambiguity in the
still keep "the elementary rules" of the law of contracts intact. As a result, our
common law of standardized contracts is highly contradictory and confusing,
and the potentialities inherent in the common law system for coping with con-
tracts of adhesion have not been fully developed.
Kessler, supra note 21, at 633.
40. See supra note 26.
41. Kessler, supra note 21, at 633; Keeton, Reasonable Expectations in the Second
Decade, 12 FORUM 275, 278 (1976). See also cases cited infra note 54.
42. See generally Kennedy, supra note 24.
43. Keeton, supra note 41.
Keeton credits the following passage from Kievit v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J.
475, 482, 170 A.2d 22, 26 (1961), as foreshadowing a basic change in insurance law: "When
meoibers of the public purchase policies of insurance they are entitled to the broad measure of
protection necessary to fulfill their reasonable expectations." Keeton, supra note 41, at 275.
44. An example of one such approach is the "Wayfaring Fool" doctrine. Young, Lewis
& Lee, Insurance Contract Interpretation: Issues and Trends, 1975 INS. L.J. 71, 74 (duty of
insurer to use language sufficiently clear that a "wayfaring man, though a fool, might not be
deceived"). See also Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. UL. REV. 131 (1970) (advocating that
a contract be viewed as a thing with the result that warranty theories would apply).
45. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions (pt. 1), 83
HARV. L. REV. 961, 967 (1970). At the time it was put forth, Keeton termed reasonable
expectations a "principle," i.e., a method of explaining the inconsistent judicial opinions in
insurance contract interpretation.
46. The reasonable expectations doctrine has not been without its critics, as the follow-
ing passage suggests: "'Reasonable expectations' is a euphemism for 'reasonable deal.' Thus,
courts have decided that it is permissible to rewrite the terms of insurance contracts where
they feel a 'raw deal' has resulted. Contract law has, in this context, at least, become 'contort
law.'" Haley, The Interpretation of Ambiguous Terms of Bankers Blanket Bonds (pt. 1), 18
FOR THE DEFENSE 29, 31 (1977).
Additionally, courts have rejected the reasonable expectations approach. See Casey v.
Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 600 P.2d 1387 (1979) (rejecting the insured's assertion
that an earlier plurality opinion embraced reasonable expectations); Morgan v. State Farm
Life Ins. Co., 240 Or. 113, 400 P.2d 223 (1965).
47. The purest form of the doctrine would honor a policyholder's reasonable expecta-
tions even "when the language of an unusual provision is clearly understandable." Keeton,
supra note 45, at 968.
48. INA Life Ins. Co. v. Brundin, 533 P.2d 236 (Alaska 1975); Continental Ins. Co. v.
Bussell, 498 P.2d 706 (Alaska 1972).
49. DiOrio v. New Jersey Mfr. Ins. Co., 79 N.J. 257, 398 A.2d 1274 (1979); Bryan
Constr. Co. v. Employers' Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 60 N.J. 375, 290 A.2d 138 (1972); Jones v.
Continental Casualty Co., 123 N.J. Super. 353, 303 A.2d 91 (1973).
policy provisions. 50 So many judicial opinions had paid homage to
the approach, that by 1976 Professor Keeton termed the acceptance
of reasonable expectations as "explicit judicial endorsement of a new
ground of decision - a development connoted by the term
'doctrine.' -51
During the 1960's and early 1970's, Pennsylvania courts were
reluctant to relinquish well-settled contract law principles in favor of
the new reasonable expectations technique of contract interpretation.
The judiciary readily applied the language of the insurance contract
against the interests of the insured when the insured was a business
organization. 52 When the policyholder was an individual consumer,
however, the courts strained to find an ambiguity in order to create
an opportunity to apply the contra proferentem53 rule against the
insurance company.54
The 1974 Superior Court case, Hionis v. Northern Mutual In-
surance Co.,55 commenced a new phase in insurance contract inter-
pretation in Pennsylvania. In ruling on whether a provision in a fire
insurance policy covering the policyholder's improvements to rented
property5" could be used to reduce the full policy benefits, the court
50. See cases from California, Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Texas, and Washington cited at
Comment, A Reasonable Approach to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations as Applied to
Insurance Contracts, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 603, 609 n.22 (1980).
51. Keeton, supra note 41, at 276.
52. Eastcoast Equip. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 207 Pa. Super. 383, 218 A.2d 91
(1966).
53. See supra note 26.
54. See, e.g., Frisch v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 218 Pa. Super. 211, 275
A.2d 849 (1971). In Frisch, the defendant insurer issued a homeowners policy which excluded
from coverage injuries to persons on the insured's premises "because of a business conducted
thereon." Id. at 213, 275 A.2d at 850. The plaintiff was injured when he fell from a ladder
while painting the policyholder's house. The court held that an ambiguity existed in the policy
because the exclusion did not distinguish between persons who are on the premises while pa-
tronizing a business operated by the property owner and persons who are conducting business
on the premises as business invitees of the owner. Therefore, the court found that coverage did
exist and reversed the trial court's judgment for the insurer. See also Purdy v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 50 Pa. D. & C.2d 230 (1970) (Allegheny Co. Court of Common Pleas).
For other opinions utilizing varying degrees of ambiguity to support a ruling in favor of
the policyholder, see Papadell v. Harleysville Mut. Casualty Co., 411 Pa. 214, 191 A.2d 274
(1963); Evans v. Baltimore Life Ins. Co., 216 Pa. Super. 425, 268 A.2d 155 (1970); Barth v.
State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 214 Pa. Super. 434, 257 A.2d 671 (1969).
55. 230 Pa. Super. 51 I, 327 A.2d 363 (1974) (Hoffman, J.).
56. The provision relied on by the insurance company stated:
(3) [Tlhe liability of this company should be determined as follows:
(b) If not repaired or replaced within a reasonable time after such loss, that
portion of the original cost at the time of installation of the damaged or de-
stroyed improvements and betterments, which the unexpired term of the lease at
the time of the loss bears to the period(s) from the date(s) of such improvements
and betterments were made to the expiration date of the lease.
Id. at 514, 327 A.2d at 364 (emphasis deleted). Since the insured did not replace the improve-
ments promptly because of the unavailability of financing, the insurer offered him $12,733.86
as the value of the remaining use interest of the improvements which had been insured for
$49,500.
stated in dictum, 57 "Even where [sic] a policy is written in unambig-
uous terms, the burden of establishing the applicability of an exclu-
sion or limitation involves proof that the insured was aware of the
exclusion or limitation and that the effect thereof was explained to
him."158 Later court opinions59 readily employed this language, which
clearly went beyond the ostensibly objective6 0 reasonable expecta-
tions approach by hinging the coverage question on the subjective
mental state of the policyholder. Hailed as a standard by which the
adhesive nature of an insurance contract can be counterbalanced,61
the Hionis standard was widely accepted as law in Pennsylvania.62
The standard created practical problems for insurance companies,
however, since it decreased63 the predictability of the legal effect of
an insurance policy and potentially reduced the coverage dispute to
weighing the credibility of the policyholder against that of the in-
surer's agent.64
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had its first opportunity to en-
dorse or reject the Hionis approach in Standard Venetian Blind Co.
v. American Empire Insurance Co. 5 The court's decision, which has
been66 and will be relied upon to frame the degree of control that
lower courts are to exercise over insurance contracts, instructed that
traditional principles of contract law interpretation 7 rather than
57. The passage was termed "dictum" by the concurring justices in Standard Venetian
Blind, 503 Pa. at 313, 469 A.2d at 570 (Hutchinson, J., concurring), presumably because the
Hionis court termed the policy language "technical and unclear," 230 Pa. Super. at 517, 327
A.2d at 366, requiring only an application of the contra proferentem rule.
58. 230 Pa. Super. at 517, 327 A.2d at 365 (emphasis added).
59. Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Bruno, 718 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1983); O'Malley v. Conti-
nental Ins. Co., 305 Pa. Super. 302, 451 A.2d 542 (1982); Kelmo Enters. v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 285 Pa. Super. 13, 426 A.2d 680 (1981); Oliver B. Cannon & Son, Inc. v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co., 484 F. Supp. 1375 (D.Del. 1980) (applying Pennsylvania law);
Klischer v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 281 Pa. Super. 292, 422 A.2d 175 (1980); cf. Brokers
Title Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 610 F.2d 1174 (3d Cir. 1979).
60. W. Keeton, supra note 45, at 967-68. But see Comment, A Reasonable Approach
to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations as Applied to Insurance Contracts, supra note 50,
at 617-18 (lack of guidelines for determining reasonableness renders reasonable expectations
doctrine subjective).
61. See, e.g., Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 503 Pa. 300,
321, 469 A.2d 563, 574 (1983) (Nix, J., dissenting).
62. Bishop v. Washington, No. 83-1818, slip op. at 6-7 (Pa. Super. July 6, 1984); see
also cases cited in note 60 supra.
63. Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins. Co., 503 Pa. 300, 306, 469
A.2d 563, 567 (1983).
64. Id.
65. 503 Pa. 300, 469 A.2d 563 (1983).
66. The following cases have been decided by relying on the Standard Venetian Blind
decision, and have been resolved in favor of the insurer: Bishop v. Washington, No. 83-1818,
slip op. (Pa. Super. July 6, 1984); Patula v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 84-27056, slip
op. (Pa. Super. July 6, 1984); Haegele v. Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co., No. 83-1663, slip op.
(Pa. Super. June 22, 1984); Votedian v. General Accident Fire and Life Assurance Corp., No.
83-2399, slip op. (Pa. Super. June 8, 1984).
67. The court began its analysis with a recitation of the principles that were to govern:
The task of interpreting a contract is generally performed by a court rather than
by a jury. . . . The goal of that task is, of course, to ascertain the intent of the
those of Hionis should be used. The court refused to deviate from
the "clear and unambiguous" ' language of the policy exclusions
since to do so "would require [the court] to rewrite the parties' writ-
ten contract."6 9 That the policyholder was not apprised of the effect
of the exclusions, did not read the contract, and may have reasona-
bly expected coverage, afforded him no relief from the provisions.
The majority gave the exclusions their full effect and decided that
Standard Venetian Blind's claim was properly denied by American
Empire Insurance.
The court supported the use of traditional contract law with the
assertion that desirable policy goals of keeping insurance costs low
and facilitating rapid resolution to coverage questions would thereby
be enhanced.7" By placing greater weight on the language of the pol-
icy, the court reasoned that the insurer attains greater confidence in
the policy which allows him to reduce the judicial risk71 component
of premiums. Additionally, the greater certainty discourages litiga-
tion and the associated costs and delays. The majority opinion im-
pliedly criticized Hionis for boosting insurance costs and contribut-
ing to delays, and consequently ordered: "Hionis . . . is not to be
followed." 72
Strict enforcement of the language of the contract's limiting
provisions by the application of the Standard Venetian Blind ap-
proach presupposes a finding that the provisions are unambiguous.7 3
parties as manifested by the language of the written instrument. . . . Where a
provision of a policy is ambiguous, the policy provision is to be construed in
favor of the insured and against the insurer, the drafter of the agreement ...
Where, however, the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, a court
is required to give effect to that language .... "[i1n the absence of fraud, 'fail-
ure to read [the contract] is an unavailing excuse or defense and cannot justify
an avoidance, modification or nullification of the contract or any provision
thereof.' "
503 Pa. at 304-05, 469 A.2d at 566 (citations omitted). Courts traditionally used these princi-
ples to interpret contracts. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
68. 503 Pa. at 306, 469 A.2d at 566.
69. id.
70. Id. at 306, 469 A.2d at 567.
71. "Judicial risk" refers to the risk carried by the insurance company that a court will
decide a coverage question adversely even though the insurer did not intend the policy to cover
the contingency and therefore did not otherwise base its premium on the risk that that contin-
gency would occur.
72. 503 Pa. at 306, 469 A.2d at 567.
73. Whether the traditional contract law approach, which shifts the focus of inquiry
from the existence of the policyholder's understanding or reasonable expectations to the exis-
tence of an ambiguity, furthers the desire for objectivity has been questioned. "The greatest
hindrance to predictability in standard insurance contract analysis is the use of the term 'am-
biguity.' " Comment, A Reasonable Approach to Reasonable Expectations as Applied to In-
surance Contracts, supra note 50, at 606. The author has identified three sources of ambiguity:
first, the inconspicuousness of exclusionary clauses which fail to adequately warn the policy-
holder of a limitation on coverage; second, terms which are incorrect, uncertain or unclear
resulting in ambiguity because the scope of coverage is uncertain or a definition is unclear or
illogical; and third, extrinsic information, such as brochures or applications, which may not be
consistent with the policy. Id. at 606-07.
Since provisions that can be termed "ambiguous" would be open to
more liberal treatment, the key question in terms of the ultimate
legal effect given to a particular provision is, necessarily, whether the
provision is unambiguous, defined by the court as "clearly worded
and conspicuously displayed."7 ' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
opinion gave little guidance to aid in this determination. The court
relied on the trial judge's conclusion that the language of the exclu-
sions in the Standard Venetian Blind policy was "plain and free of
ambiguity" 75 rather than announcing helpful guidelines upon which
a future court could base its conclusion. In addition, the court's dis-
cussion of the conspicuously displayed requirement would be of mini-
mal aid to a future court's decision making process since it offered
only a cursory 76 explanation of the requirement that could be applied
to nearly any modern standardized insurance contract.7
Although the court instructed that greater weight should be ac-
corded the written language of an insurance policy, it also indicated
that a judge may occasionally be justified in deviating from unam-
biguous language when interpreting an insurance contract. 78 In sup-
port of the latter proposition, the court cited the unconscionability
provision of the Uniform Commercial Code,79 which Pennsylvania
has enacted. 80 Courts have generally chosen not to interpret the un-
74. 503 Pa. at 307, 469 A.2d at 567.
75. Id. at 304, 469 A.2d at 565-66 ("The court of common pleas found that exclusions
(n) and (o) set forth in the policy were 'plain and free of ambiguity,' and that these provisions
expressly excluded coverage for damage to the portico."); Id. at 304, 469 A.2d at 566 ("As
found by the court of common pleas, the exclusions at issue are 'plain and free of ambiguity,'
and could have been readily comprehended by Mr. Morris had he chosen to read them.").
76. This statement provided the only indicia of reasoning behind the court's conclusion
that the policy provisions were conspicuously displayed: "Immediately below the coverage pro-
vision was a section captioned 'Exclusions.' Under this section, conspicuously displayed and
sequentially listed, were set forth the types of claims and losses for which American [Empire
Insurance] was not obligated to defend or indemnify [Standard] Venetian [Blind]." Id. at 303,
469 A.2d at 565.
77. See the standard policies appended to Elliott, supra note 9, at 12-21 to 12-89.
78. 503 Pa. at 307, 469 A.2d at 567.
79. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978).
80. 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2302 (Purdon Supp. 1984). The provision provides:
(a) Finding and authority of court. - If the court as a matter of law finds the
contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made, the court may:
(1) refuse to enforce the contract;(2) enforce the remainder of the con-
tract without the unconscionable clause; or(3) so limit the application of
any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(b) Evidence by parties - When it is claimed or appears to the court that the
contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be af-
forded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting,
purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
Although the provision applies only to sales of goods, 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2102
(Purdon 1984), the court must have meant that the contractual unconscionability concept
would apply to insurance policies by analogy. Cf. Stanley A. Klopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co.,
510 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (law developed under U.C.C. unconscionability provision
used to test authorized dealership agreement for unconscionability).
conscionability doctrine broadly, using unconscionability to find evi-
dence of defect in contract formation rather than to strike down a
contract provision when the substantive effect is unfair."' The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court has followed this approach, requiring both
an absence of meaningful choice in formation and oppressive sub-
stantive terms.82 Therefore, the majority justices' citation to the un-
conscionability provision indicates the narrowness of the scope of ju-
dicial control that may be exerted by the Pennsylvania judiciary.83
The concurring and dissenting justices found the majority's
traditional approach harsh and inappropriate for analysis of modern
insurance contracts. The concurring justices favored the reasonable
expectations doctrine,84 and would have found for the insurer since
they believed that a reasonable businessman would not have ex-
pected that his insurer would act as guarantor of the quality of his
workmanship. 8  Justice Nix, dissenting, preferred application of the
Hionis standard88 and would have ruled for the insured since the
insurer failed to prove that the policyholder was aware of the exis-
tence and effect of the exclusions87
As a result of Standard Venetian Blind, lower courts will be less
free to openly acknowledge the reasoning they use when fairness dic-
tates a ruling in favor of the insured. Although the Hionis standard,
which confronts insurance companies with serious practical
problems, was destined to be overruled, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court overreacted to these shortcomings by instructing that tradi-
tional contract interpretive techniques should be employed in insur-
ance policy coverage cases. Lower courts are likely to revert to their
pre-Hionis technique of straining to find an ambiguity in straightfor-
ward language when fairness requires a ruling in favor of an insur-
ance consumer.
81. Comment, supra note 25, at 1157-59; see also Price, The Conscience of Judge and
Jury: Statutory Unconscionability as a Mixed Question of Law and Fact, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 743,
757-58 (1981).
82. Witner v. Exxon, 495 Pa. 540, 434 A.2d 1222 (1981); accord Stanley A. Klopp,
Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Evanoff v. York Fed. Say. and
Loan, 98 Dauphin Co. Rep. 49 (1975); see also Melso v. Texaco, 532 F. Supp. 1280 (E.D. Pa.
1982).
83. In Price, supra note 81, the author criticizes U.C.C. § 2-302 for achieving no pre-
dictability of results despite the aim of the drafters. If this criticism is accepted, use of the
unconscionability doctrine would be inconsistent with one of the stated policy objectives put
forth by the Standard Venetian Blind court. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
85. 503 Pa. at 307-08, 469 A.2d at 567 (Hutchinson, J., concurring).
86. See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
87. 503 Pa. at 321, 469 A.2d at 574 (Nix, J., dissenting).
[Casenote by Karl A. Thallner, Jr.].

TORTS-MENTAL DISTRESS-MISSOURI REDEFINES THE STANDARD
OF RECOVERY FOR NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED EMOTIONAL DIS-
TRESS ABSENT PHYSICAL IMPACT OR SUBSEQUENT PHYSICAL
CONSEQUENCE. Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo.
1983) (en banc).
In Bass v. Nooney Co.,1 a divided 2 Missouri Supreme Court
abandoned the application of the "impact rule"' in emotional dis-
tress cases.4 The court analyzed and rejected the frequently stated
rationale supporting the impact rule,5 and ultimately concluded that
the automatic denial of mental distress claims absent proof of con-
temporaneous injury was inequitable, impractical, and illogical.6 The
court also declined to impose a standard of recovery which would
require the plaintiff to prove that he suffered physical harm as a
consequence of the mental or emotional distress.7 In reaching its
conclusion, the court recognized the need to limit its new rule8 and,
I. 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
2. Judge Wasserstrom wrote the majority opinion and was joined by Senior Judge
Seiler and Judges Higgins and Gunn. Judges Welliver and Donnelly filed separate dissenting
opinions.
3. Under the physical injury rule, otherwise known as the "impact rule", "[tlo sustain
recovery for emotional distress and bodily harm resulting therefrom, plaintiff must suffer a
traumatic physical injury through the fault of defendant, unless there is extreme and outra-
geous conduct on the part of the defendant intentionally or recklessly causing the emotional
distress." Williams v. School Dist., 447 S.W.2d 256, 266 (Mo. 1969). See Victorian Ry.
Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888) (damages for mental shock arising from fear
unaccompanied by physical injury were too remote); Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y.
107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896) (no recovery for injuries sustained by fright occasioned by the negli-
gence of another where there is no immediate personal injury); Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168
Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897) (no recovery for fright, terror, alarm, anxiety, or distress of
mind absent impact). See generally Torts-Negligence-Direct Impact Rule, 39 TEMP. L.Q.
229 (1966).
4. The court used the terms "mental" distress and "emotional" distress interchangea-
bly. Medically speaking, mental distress resulting from a negligent act may be defined as a
reaction to a traumatic stimulus. A traumatic stimulus can be defined as an impact, force, or
event which affects an individual for either a brief or extended period of time, and can be
physical or purely psychic. See Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 40, 43 (1956);
Smith & Solomon, Traumatic Neurosis in Court, 30 VA. L. REV. 87, 123 (1944). See gener-
ally M. MCLEAN, LEGAL ISSUES IN MEDICINE (1981); LAUGHLIN, Neurosis Following
Trauma, in 6 TRAUMATIC MEDICINE AND SURGERY FOR THE ATTORNEY 76 (P. Cantor ed.
1962). For an explanation of the legal implications of the term "mental" or "emotional" dis-
tress, see infra note 9.
5. See infra notes 83-87, 91-96, 101-04 and accompanying text.
6. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 772.
7. Id. See infra.notes 46-58, 108-13 and accompanying text.
8. Id. at 772-73. The court appreciated the need to prevent undue extension of liabil-
ity and, therefore, predicated recovery upon both the foresecability and severity of the mental
harm. Id.
therefore, refused to extend liability to include cases in which a
plaintiff suffers inconsequential injury.9 An individual who suffers
from mental distress allegedly caused by the negligence of another
will be permitted to recover for this distress, absent a showing of
physical impact or subsequent physical injury, provided that the de-
fendant should have known his actions would create an unreasonable
risk of causing distress and the emotional distress is of sufficient se-
verity to be both medically diagnosable and medically significant."
Collette Bass was employed as a relief receptionist 1 by General
Dynamics Company, which occupied several floors of a building
owned and operated by the Nooney Company. On April 6, 1976, at
approximately 11:15 a.m., 2 Bass entered an elevator on the twen-
tieth floor of the office building to ascend to the twenty-third floor.
The elevator started moving upward but soon came to a grinding
stop. Bass waited momentarily and then began pushing the emer-
gency button, pounding on the elevator door, and shouting for help.
The building maintenance workers eventually freed Bass one-half
hour after the elevator stalled. Immediately following the incident,
Bass was visibly shaken and distraught; and subsequently was ad-
vised to go to the area hospital." Bass remained in the hospital for
five days and did not return to work until May 2, 1976, nearly one
month after the incident. The attending psychiatrist at the hospital' 4
9. Id. The term "threshold tort" refers to the minimum requirements needed to estab-
lish a defendant's liability for emotional harm. The legal definition and interpretation of "emo-
tional harm" dictates what these minimum requirements will be. The plaintiff must prove
medical harm to the degree required by law, but this burden is difficult to meet in mental
distress cases because the term "mental distress" has varying legal interpretations, which re-
sult in varying limits of emotional tort liability. Several authorities stress the need for a defini-
tion of "emotional harm" which excludes mere upset, dismay, humiliation, grief, and anger. At
a minimum, emotional harm needed to support a threshold tort may include shock, continued
nervousness, sleeplessness, or nausea that requires medication. Serious disorders and neuroses
also satisfy the requirement. This is a clouded area of the law that only recently is becoming
more clearly defined and standardized. See generally Comment, Negligence and the Infliction
of Emotional Harm: A Reappraisal of the Nervous Shock Cases, 35 U. Cm. L. REV. 512
(1968); Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case Jbr an Independent Tort,
59 GEO. L.J. 1237 (1971); Comment, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: California Ex-
pands Liability for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress, 33 HASTINGS L. 291 (1981);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A comment c (1979).
10. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 772-73.
11. Bass' duties consisted, in part, of covering for various company secretaries during
these secretaries' periodic rest breaks and lunch breaks. Id. at 766.
12. The Missouri Supreme Court noted that at another point in her testimony, Bass
estimated that she had entered the elevator "at about quarter of eleven." Id. Bass was confined
in the elevator for a period between one-half hour and one hour.
13. On April 7, 1976, the day following the incident, Bass entered another elevator in
the building and collapsed. A Nooney company doctor escorted her to the hospital. The hospi-
tal record showed "she had experienced acute anxiety, slurred speech, her equilibrium was off,
she felt light-headed, cold and thoroughly frightened, and too scared to sleep the night before."
Id. at 767. Bass claimed that the confinement caused her to feel tense and strange in elevators
and cars, and to lose her patience more often than she did before the incident. Id.
14. Dr. Hartnett testified that although Bass "had objective symptoms of anxiety,
hyperhidroses of her palms, she was hyperventilating, her pupils were dilated, and her walking
testified with medical certainty' 5 that Bass suffered from a severe
anxiety reaction' precipitated by her confinement in the elevator.
Bass sought damages for fright and mental distress caused by
the alleged negligence of both the Nooney Company and the Otis
Elevator Company.17 At the close of plaintiff's evidence, the trial
court, applying the impact rule, sustained the defendants' motion to
dismiss.'" The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District
also applied the impact rule and affirmed the lower court decision.' 9
The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri which iden-
tified the issues in the case to be first, whether plaintiff could rely on
the principal of res ipsa loquitur ° to establish defendants' negli-
gence" and second, whether the application of the impact rule
should be reconsidered and changed.22
Although the law readily protects an individual's physical and
economic well-being from destructive interference, it is largely un-
willing to allow recovery for detrimental interference with mental
capacity.2" Traditionally, an individual has been able to recover
was unstable," she would not, in his opinion, suffer "permanent disability." Id. For a discus-
sion of the medical meanings of these terms, see generally R. GRAY, ATTORNEY'S TEXTBOOK
OF MEDICINE (3d ed. 1983).
15. An expert is often asked to testify in court to determine facts or resolve doubts
regarding difficult issues within his sphere of special knowledge. Medical experts usually are
called to reinforce or dispute the causal relationship between an accident and the alleged resul-
tant injury. Based upon the expert's individual knowledge and review of all records and evi-
dence, the expert then makes a determination, to the best of his medical ability, as to the cause
of the alleged disability. For a thorough discussion of the medical expert in court, see generally
E. GORDON, A PRACTICAL MEDICO-LEGAL GUIDE FOR THE PHYSICIAN (1973); 1 J. SCHMIDT,
ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER (1982); 2 LAWYERS' MEDICAL
CYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL INJURIES AND ALLIED SPECIALTIES §§ 13.1-13.98 (rev. vol. 1979).
16. Anxiety can be defined as a state of mind characterized by apprehension as well as
unreasonable or vague fear. The condition usually is accompanied by restlessness, uncertainty,
indecision, irritability, mental depression and, at times, shortness of breath, nausea, and rapid
heart beat. During an anxiety reaction, the trauma produces acute tension that results in
symptoms which are typically real, identifiable, and can be disabling. For an excellent review
of both legal and medical implications of mental distress see J. SCHMIDT, supra note 15; Com-
ment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, supra note 9;
LAUGHLIN, Neurosis Following Trauma, supra note 4.
17. The Otis Elevator Company, manufacturer of the malfunctioning elevator, was
joined as a defendant along with the Nooney Company. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 768.
18. The trial court entered a directed verdict for defendants on the ground that plain-
tiff suffered no impact. Id. at 766. The trial court opinion was not reported.
19. The court of appeals based its decision on the fact that the plaintiff was not thrown
against the elevator and her "slight, trivial, minor physical contacts with the elevator when she
pushed the emergency bell button ...were insufficient to constitute the 'traumatic physical
injury' required . . . to activate the physical rule." Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765, 780
(Mo. App. 1983) (en banc). Furthermore, the malfunction was so minor that the distress prob-
ably was caused by Bass' impending divorce, and her obligation to take care of her mother, a
recent stroke victim. Id.
20. See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text. The court considered this issue to be
ancillary to the main issue concerning the impact rule.
21. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 767.
22. Id. at 767-68.
23. It often has been stated that mental disturbances are not equivalent in severity to
confirmed physical injuries, or injuries that are accompanied by physical manifestations and
symptoms:
damages for mental distress only if he could demonstrate that the
distress was intentionally inflicted,24 the evidence supported an inde-
pendent cause of action in tort or contract,25 or the requirements of
the impact rule were satisfied.2 Under the impact rule, plaintiffs
who have not suffered an actual physical impact to their person by
the negligent force of another are denied the right to maintain a
cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. 7
Both courts' and plaintiffs' dissatisfaction with the impact rule's
stringent prerequisites for recovery prompted many jurisdictions to
create and employ various liberalized standards of recovery in
mental distress cases.2 8 The impact rule - long the subject of fre-
quent criticism2 9 - has been abandoned in nearly all jurisdictions in
This distinction is based upon the ground that in an action for a bodily injury or
illness resulting from a mental or emotional disturbance, the basis of the action
is the bodily injury or illness, an interest always afforded protection by law,
while the mental or emotional disturbance, an interest not generally afforded
independent protection by law, is merely a link in the chain of causation.
38 AM. JUR. 2D Fright, Shock, Etc. § 18 (1968). See also Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168
Mass. 285, 47 N.E. 88 (1897).
24. Until the 1930's, recovery for emotional distress was generally allowed only in con-
nection with traditional intentional torts such as assault, battery, false imprisonment, trespass,
malicious prosecution, nuisance, seduction, conversion, invasion of privacy, and defamation.
See PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 28-49 (4th ed. 1971). At one time, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress was not recognized as an independent tort, therefore,
emotional distress damages were considered to be parasitic damages. All states now recognize
the intentional infliction of emotional distress as aa independent tort, and allow recovery for
severe emotional distress, disturbance, fright or shock intentionally caused by extreme and
outrageous conduct. Recovery is allowed despite absence of physical injury or impact. See
State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952);Smith v.
Aldridge, 356 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. App. 1962); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 629, 596
S.W.2d 681 (1980); Sheltra v. Smith, 136 Vt. 472, 392 A.2d 431 (1978); Zimmerman v.
Associates Discount Corp., 444 S.W.2d 396 (Mo. 1969); cf. Bencomo v. Morgan, 210 So. 2d
236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (no recovery against defendant-doctor who agreed to support a
petition to have plaintiff declared incompetent); Deming v. Kellogg, 41 Colo. App. 264, 583
P.2d 944 (1978) (mere occurrence of an accident did not necessarily mean that outrageous
conduct was present); Rawson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 530 F. Supp. 776 (D. Colo. 1982) (no
recovery against defendant-employer who allegedly willfully, wantonly, and maliciously fired
the plaintiff). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 46, 546 (1965).
25. See Schmitz v. St. Louis, I.M. & S.R.R., 119 Mo. 256, 24 S.W. 472 (1893);
Frewen v. Page, 238 Mass. 499, 131 N.E. 475 (1921); Guillory v. Godfrey, 134 Cal. App. 2d
628, 286 P.2d 474 (1955); Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 55 S.E.2d 810 (1949); Stewart
v. Rudner, 349 Mich. 459, 84 N.W.2d 816 (1957). See generally MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 145 (1935).
26. See supra note 3. See infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965); Battalla v.
State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375
Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965). See
infra notes 46, 49, 52, 58-60 and 67 and accompanying text.
29. The impact rule has come under extensive scholarly criticism expressed through a
multitude of articles written on the subject. See Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CALIF. L.
REV. 40 (1956); Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L.
REV. 874 (1939); Comment, negligently Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case For An Indepen-
dent Tort, supra note 9; Note, Mental Distress-The Impact Rule, 42 UMKC L. REV. 234
(1973); Note, Redefining the Limits to Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress, 11
TULSA L.J. 587 (1976); Comment, Mental Distress as an Actionable Tortious Wrong, 37
UMKC L. REV. 371 (1969).
the United States.30
American courts have expressed differing views concerning re-
covery for mental distress absent physical impact.3 ' These varying
positions have resulted, in large part, from the diverse methods
courts have developed to analyze the concepts of duty, foreseeability,
and proximate cause.3 2 Traditionally, conservative courts considered
the duty owed by negligent defendants to victims of mental distress
to be greatly limited or nonexistent. 33 These jurisdictions have fol-
lowed the impact rule long after most liberal jurisdictions expanded
the scope of recovery in mental distress cases."
The leading case applying the impact rule to negligent infliction
of emotional distress cases is the 1888 decision of Mitchell v. Roch-
ester Railway.3  The reasoning in Mitchell set forth the idea that
"[aissuming that fright cannot form the basis of an action, it is obvi-
ous that no recovery can be had for injuries resulting therefrom." ' 6
The Mitchell court concluded that because a cause of action could
not be maintained for fright alone, the severity of the resultant in-
jury was irrelevant. 37 The court, relying on public policy considera-
tions,38 also reasoned that the plaintiff's injuries were not within the
30. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 54 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER]. Prosser lists the states of Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine,
Massaclusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio, Virginia, and Washington as states that adhere to
the impact rule. Id. Since that listing, the number of adherents has decreased. Recent deci-
sions indicate that the following states have rejected the impact rule: Maine in Wallace v.
Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970); Massachusetts in Dziokonski v.
Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (1978); Michigan in Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich.
4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970); Ohio in Schultz v. Barberton, 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109
(1983); Virginia in Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973); and Washington in
Schurk v. Christensen, 80 Wash. 2d 652, 497 P.2d 937 (1972).
31. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
32. See generally PROSSER, supra note 30, at 327-35; Comment, Negligently Inflicted
Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, supra note 9.
33. See supra note 32.
34. See supra note 30. (Note, unless otherwise stated, the phrase "victims of mental
distress" denotes victims who suffered no contemporaneous physical impact or injury. The
phrase shall have this meaning with regard to "impact rule" analysis only).
35. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
36. Id. at 354. In the Mitchell case, the court denied recovery for mental distress,
which was allegedly caused by the defendant's negligent operation of a team of horses, that
ultimately resulted in plaintiff's miscarriage. The Mitchell decision was inspired by the 1888
British case of Victorian Ry. Comm'rs v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 (1888). In that case, the
Privy Council concluded that damages for shock arising from fear unaccompanied by physical
injury were too remote and could not "be considered a consequence which, in the ordinary
course of things, would flow from the negligence ... ." Id. at 225. The Coultas decision was
expressly overruled thirteen years later in the case of Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669
(1901) (court permitted a cause of action for serious illness and the premature birth of plain-
tiff's baby resulting from distress, which was caused by defendant's negligent operation of his
horse-drawn van).
37. Mitchell, 151 N.Y. at 107, 45 N.E. at 354. "That the result may be nervous dis-
ease, blindness, insanity, or even a miscarriage, in no way changes the principle. These results
merely show the degree of fright, or the extent of damages." Id.
38. See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
rule of proximate damages and, therefore, were not recoverable.3"
By 1930, a majority of American courts had adopted the Mitch-
ell rationale and thirty-one jurisdictions had implemented laws re-
sembling the impact rule.4 ° Justifications in support of the impact
rule originally set forth in Mitchell were later reiterated clearly and
concisely by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Niederman v. Brod-
sky.4 The court enunciated the following justifications for the rule's
existence: the difficulty medical science would have proving a causal
relation between the subjective symptoms of distress and the defen-
dant's alleged negligent act; the possibility of an increased number
of fictitious injuries and fraudulent claims; and the possibility that
extending the boundaries of recovery would cause a flood of litiga-
tion." After 1930, however, several jurisdictions refused to adopt the
impact rule and many courts that previously accepted the rule began
to question its utility. 3 In response to increased criticism, courts be-
gan to allow recovery for mental distress in cases in which plaintiffs
proved extremely slight impact."' These sympathetic efforts by the
39. Mitchell, 151 N.Y. at 107, 45 N.E. at 355. The rule of proximate damages states
that these damages are the ordinary and natural results of the negligence charged and, there-
fore, are reasonably expected. Id. Injuries that are the result of accidental or unusual circum-
stances cannot be anticipated or controlled by the defendant and are too remote to form a
cause of action for relief. Id.
40. See Note, Mental Distress-The Impact Rule, 42 UMKC L. REV. 234 (1973).
41. 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970) (plaintiff-pedestrian suffered a severe heart attack
after defendant-motorist skidded onto the sidewalk, struck his son, and nearly hit the plaintiff).
The Niederman court analyzed and rejected the three traditional policy arguments stated in
support of the impact rule. The court chose to abandon the requirement of physical impact as
a prerequisite for recovery of damages proximately caused by the negligence of the named
defendant. Id. at 406, 261 A.2d at 90. The court limited the rule to cases in which the plaintiff
was in personal danger of physical impact "because of the direction of a negligent force
against him and where plaintiff actually did fear the physical impact." Id.
42. Id. at 405-13, 261 A.2d at 86-90. For an in-depth analysis and criticism of each of
the three policy justifications see, e.g., Sinn v. Burd,, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979); Tobin
v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969); Falzone v. Busch,
45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965); Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d
259 (1969); Robb v. Pennsylvania R.R., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965); Leong v.
Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Culbert v. Samson's Supermarkets Inc., 444
A.2d 433 (Me. 1982); Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 197 S.E.2d 214 (1973); Stewart v. Gil-
liam, 271 So.2d 466 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Schultz v. Barberton, 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447
N.E.2d 109 (1983), Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d, 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34
(1961).
43. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Porter v. Delaware L&W.R.R., 73 N.J.L. 405, 63 A. 860 (1906) (dust in
the eye sufficient impact); Kenney v. Wong Len, 81 N.H. 427, 128 A. 343 (1925) (mousehair
in stew touching roof of plaintiff's mouth); Jansen v. Minneapolis St. L. Ry., 112 Minn. 496,
128 N.W. 826 (1910) (hitting plaintiff over the head with a hat); McCardle v. George B. Peck
Dry Goods Co., 191 Mo. App. 263, 177 S.W. 1095 (1915) (slight jar sufficient impact); Mor-
ton v. Stack, 122 Ohio St. 115, 170 N.E. 869 (1930) (child inhaled smoke while trapped in a
burning building); Zelinsky v. Chimics, 196 Pa. Super. 312, 175 A.2d 351 (1961) (impact of
car's collision sufficient). But see Koplin v. Louis K. Liggett Co., 332 Pa. 333, 185 A. 744
(1936) (nausea over presence of centipede in soup not sufficient); Tuttle v. Meyer Dairy Prod-
ucts Co., 138 N.E.2d 429 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956) (no impact when glass was found in mouth
while eating); Hamilton v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 132 A.2d 500 (D.C. 1957) (no recovery
for drinking softdrink containing matches).
courts to avoid the doctrine, however, did not alleviate the rule's
harsh effect of denying claims to those individuals who suffered
merely mental distress. 45 In light of courts' efforts to evade the doc-
trine, abandonment of the impact rule was inevitable.
In an effort to remedy the inequities associated with the impact
rule, a majority of courts began to allow recovery for physical harm
suffered as a consequence of mental or emotional distress." This
standard, which incorporates the underlying rationale of the impact
rule, also is designed to protect against frivolous or fraudulent claims
by requiring proof of the physical manifestation of the psychic injury
before recovery will be granted."" The rule is applied in cases that
usually arise in one of two contexts. In the first situation, the defen-
dant is liable if his negligent act causes mental or emotional distress
that he realized or should have realized would result in plaintiff's
illness or bodily harm.48 In order for the plaintiff to recover, the neg-
ligent infliction of emotional distress must result in demonstrable
bodily harm. Without proof of resultant injury, mental distress fails
to afford a basis for a cause of action. 9
45. That physical impact is required, no matter how trivial, effectively denies recovery
to plaintiffs or witnesses who have suffered impacts solely in the sense of emotional upset or
disturbance. See generally Note, Redefining the Limits to Recovery for Negligently Inflicted
Mental Distress, supra note 29.
46. See, e.g., Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, 165 A. 182 (1933) (recovery granted
where clear and substantial physical injury results from frights); Bedenk v. St. Louis Pub.
Serv. Co., 285 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1955) (physical injury includes physical shock or physical
wounds or bruises); Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965) (recovery granted for
bodily injury or sickness resulting from plaintiffs fear of defendant's negligently driven auto);
Crews v. Provident Fin. Co., 271 N.C. 684, 157 S.E.2d 381 (1967) (defendant caused plain-
tiff's heart attack and elevated blood pressure when he used vulgar language to threaten plain-
tiff); Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979) (plaintiff's emotional collapse and
depression which were manifested in symptoms of spontaneous crying, shock, and ulcer consti-
tuted sufficient physical injury). But see, e.g., Wedgworth v. Ft. Worth, 189 S.W.2d 40 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1945) (loss of memory and ability to concentrate were not physical injuries); Cos-
grove v. Beymer, 244 F. Supp. 824 (D. Del. 1965) (dizziness, headaches, and nervousness
accompanying shock did not compose bodily harm); Lessard v. Tarca, 20 Conn. Supp. 295,
133 A.2d 625 (1957) (mental anguish and pain resulting from parents and child watching
another child burn to death not recoverable). For an in-depth analysis of the difficulty sur-
rounding differences between mental and physical injury, see generally Comment, Negligently
Inflicted Mental Distress: The Case for an Independent Tort, supra note 9.
47. See supra note 46.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 306, 312, 313, 436(1) (1965).
49. In this context, the individual is not threatened by possible contemporaneous physi-
cal impact. The mental distress only becomes important if it results in physical injury. E.g.,
Kuhr Bros. Inc. v. Spahos, 89 Ga. App. 885, 81 S.E.2d 491 (1954) (no recovery for father's
fright experienced while attempting to rescue son from burning house); Kaufman v. Israel
Zion Hosp., 183 Misc. 714, 51 N.Y.S.2d 412 (1944) (no recovery for mental suffering caused
by a hospital telling parents their newborn was a girl and later telling them it was a boy);
Espinosa v. Beverly Hosp., 114 Cal. App. 2d 232, 249 P.2d 843 (1952) (no recovery for deliv-
ery of wrong baby in hospital); Cushing Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Francis, 206 Okla. 553, 245
P.2d 84 (1952) (no recovery for mental distress caused by plaintiffs finding the partially de-
composed body of a mouse in a coke bottle); Gambill v. White, 303 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1957) (no
recovery for mental distress allegedly caused by defendant-hospital's failure to attend to plain-
tiff while she was giving birth). But see, e.g., Montinieri v. Southern New England Tel. Co.,
175 Conn. 337, 398 A.2d 1180 (1978) (recovery for emotional distress caused by defendant-
In the second situation, the plaintiff does fear for his own
safety. 0 The theory applied under these circumstances has been la-
beled the "zone of danger rule." ' Under this rule, liability is ex-
panded to include cases in which the plaintiff observed either danger
or actual injury to another, and simultaneously, both feared for his
own safety and was within the same zone of physical danger as the
victim. 52 Efforts to extend liability beyond the boundaries of the zone
of danger5 3 have repeatedly failed because courts fear there can be
no reasonable, equitable manner in which to limit recovery. 4 The
New York Court of Appeals in Tobin v. Grossman"6 recognized this
need to limit the rule and stated, "[e]very injury has ramifying con-
sequences, like the ripplings of the waters, without end. The problem
for the law is to limit the legal consequences of wrongs to controlla-
ble degree. . . . It is enough that the law establishes liability in favor
of those directly or intentionally harmed. ' 56 The problem of unlim-
ited liability frequently is associated with standards of recovery in
negligent infliction of mental distress cases. Often, because there is
no ready solution to the problem, courts create arbitrary distinctions
that merely replace erratically applied rules. 7 The possibility that
company's disclosure of plaintiff's address).
50. An event puts the plaintiff in a situation that poses the threat of immediate bodily
impact or injury. See infra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
5 I. Id.
52. E.g., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29
Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963) (overruled by Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 72 (1968)); Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941) (defendant's
live trolley wires fell onto car in which plaintiff was riding); Netusil v. Novak, 120 Neb. 751,
235 N.W. 335 (1930) (shock caused by attack of vicious dog was actionable without presence
of bite); Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961) (recovery
for distress caused by defendant's failure to secure safety bar of ski-lift chair); Niederman v.
Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970) (heart attack caused by stress occurring after
defendant's auto nearly hit plaintiff was actionable); Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d
12 (1965) (recovery for shock resulting from defendant's negligent operation of auto close to
plaintiff); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969)
(recovery denied to plaintiff-mother who did not see defendant's auto hit child but arrived at
the scene immediately thereafter); cf Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d
1295 (1978) (recovery granted to plaintiff-mother who did not see defendant's bus strike her
child but arrived immediately thereafter).
53. See supra note 52. The "zone of danger" literally refers to the plaintiff's physical
proximity to the victim of the actual impact.
54. Id. For the first time in negligence actions, this rule provided the plaintiff-by-
stander, who suffers mental distress caused by threatened impact, with an opportunity to re-
cover for this emotional distress. See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295,
379 P.2d 513, 2 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963). See also Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 259 A.2d
12 (1969).
55. 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969).
56. Id. at 615, 249 N.E.2d at 424, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 561-62. The Tobin decision re-
jected Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968) (see infra notes
59-62 and accompanying text), and denied recovery to a bystander who was outside the zone
of danger. The Tobin court conceded that the zone of danger requirement was an arbitrary
limitation, but justified it as the only way to prevent unlimited liability. Tobin, 24 N.Y.2d at
616, 249 N.E.2d at 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
57. See generally PROSSER, supra note 24, § 54. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS originally included a caveat suggesting that a parent or spouse may be entitled to recov-
defendants would be exposed to unlimited liability, as well as the
allegedly inconsistent nature5 s of the rule, have led some courts to
reject the zone of danger rule in favor of more liberalized, flexible
standards of recovery.
In 1968, the California Supreme Court specifically rejected the
zone of danger rule in the case of Dillon v. Legg," and became the
first jurisdiction to hold that a plaintiff mother who witnessed the
negligent infliction of death or injury to her child could recover for
mental and subsequent physical distress.6" The court granted recov-
ery despite the fact that the plaintiff suffered no impact and was
outside the zone of danger.61 The Dillon decision emphasized the im-
portance of the "foreseeability of the risk" and deemed it to be "the
chief element in determining whether [the] defendant owes a duty or
an obligation to [the] plaintiff." 2 The court then set forth three cri-
teria to be used in analyzing the foreseeability issue: whether plain-
tiff was located near the scene of the accident; whether the shock
resulted from a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff from the
sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident; and
whether the plaintiff and the victim were closely related. 3 The Dil-
ery for mental harm suffered as a result of seeing injury to the child or other spouse. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 CAVEAT (1934). In the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
the caveat was stricken, not because of direct opposition to the caveat, but because case law
had established no liability under those circumstances. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
313 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 app. (1965).
58. See infra note 60 and accompanying text. Many courts considered the zone of dan-
ger rule to be as arbitrary and harsh as the impact rule. See, e.g., Corso v. Merrill, 119 N.H.
647, 658, 406 A.2d 300, 307 (1979) ("zone of danger rule imposes unjust limitations on recov-
ery"); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 564, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1300 (1978) ("zone of
danger rule . . . lacks strong logical support"); D'Ambra v. United States, 114 R.I. 643, 657,
338 A.2d 524, 531 (1975) ("zone of danger rule ignores psychological reality").
59. 68 Cal, 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
60. Id. at 732-33, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75-76. The Dillon decision over-
ruled Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963); in which the California Supreme Court adhered to the impact rule. The Dillon court
examined the facts of the case at bar and concluded that the application of the zone of danger
rule would produce arbitrary and unjust results. The court stated:
[wle can hardly justify relief to the sister for trauma which she suffered upon
apprehension of the child's death and yet deny it to the mother merely because
of a happenstance that the sister was some few yards closer to the accident
.... The instant case exposes the hopeless artificiality of the zone-of-danger
rule.
Dillon at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
61. Dillon at 732 33, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75-76.
62. Id. at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The court, applying general tort
law principles of negligence, proximate cause, and foreseeability, focused on whether the acci-
dent and resulting harm to the bystander were reasonably foreseeable. The Dillon decision
contemplated "that courts in a case-to-case basis, analyzing all the circumstances, will decide
what the ordinary man under such circumstances should have reasonably foreseen. The courts
thus mark out the areas of liability, excluding the remote and unexpected." Id. at 741, 441
P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81. For the purposes of this casenote, the term "bystander"
refers to anyone who sustains mental distress and possibly, resultant physical injury as a result
of witnessing an injury to another, and is not limited to relatives of the victim who actually
sustained the impact.
63. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The evaluation of these factors
Ion court expressly limited its rule to cases in which the plaintiff
suffers physical injury as a consequence of emotional distress.,
Four years after the Dillon decision, the California Supreme
Court decided the case of Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals.65
The court distinguished the facts of the case from Dillon16  and al-
lowed recovery for severe emotional distress, despite the absence of
impact or consequential physical injury, because the facts of the case
guaranteed the claim's authenticity, and plaintiff's injuries were rea-
sonably foreseeable to the defendant. 7 In formulating this standard,
the Molien court relied heavily on Rodrigues v. State. 8 In Rodri-
gues, the Hawaii Supreme Court adopted the rule that recovery will
be granted if the circumstances of the case provide some assurance
that the plaintiff suffered serious mental injury resulting from defen-
dant's negligence. 9 The Molien opinion indicated that the absence
of immediate or consequential physical injury should not preclude
possible claims for mental or emotional distress, particularly in negli-
gence cases.70 The holding in Molien has been criticized as ambigu-
determines the degree of foreseeability which, in turn, depend upon the facts of each case. Id.
Only Connecticut in D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co., 31 Conn. Supp. 164, 326 A.2d 129
(1973) has adopted the Dillon approach without modification. The majority of courts that
have considered the Dillon rationale have rejected it. See, e.g., Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp.,
197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Jelley v. LaFlame, 108 N.H. 471, 238 A.2d 728 (1968);
Grimsby v. Samson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975); Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d
609, 249 N.E.2d 419, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969). Other jurisdictions have adopted the underly-
ing policy of Dillon, but have imposed additional requirements. See, e.g., Portee v. Jaffe, 84
N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521 (1980); Leong v. Takasaki, 55 Hawaii 398, 520 P.2d 758 (1974); Sinn
v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 404 A.2d 672 (1979).
64. Dillon at 740, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
65. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).
66. Id. at 921-23, 616 P.2d at 816, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 833-34. The Molien court recog-
nized that in Dillon, the plaintiff sought recovery for damages she suffered as a result of
witnessing injury to a third person; and the three guidelines listed were limitations on that
particular cause of action. Id. In contrast, Mr. Molien was a "direct victim of the assertedly
negligent act." Id. The Molien court applied only the Dillon rule's general principle of foresee-
ability to the facts of the case. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
67. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831
(1980). The plaintiff's wife underwent a physical examination in defendant-hospital during
which lab tests were misread and plaintiff was told she had syphillis. The wife suspected that
plaintiff had engaged in extramarital relations and the marriage broke up. Plaintiff sued for
negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium. The court applied a traditional
foreseeability test to the facts of the case and concluded that "[ilt is easily predictable that an
erroneous diagnosis of syphillis and its probable source would produce marital discord and
resultant emotional distress to a married patient's spouse." Id. at 923, 616 P.2d at 817, 167
Cal. Rptr. at 835. The risk of harm was reasonably foreseeable so defendant owed a duty to
plaintiff to exercise care in making the diagnosis. Id.
68. 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970). In Rodrigues, the plaintiffs sued for mental
suffering resulting from residential flood damage allegedly caused by the defendant-state's
negligence, The court allowed recovery, but limited the rule to cases in which the plaintiff
suffers "serious emotional distress." Serious emotional distress occurs "[wlhere a reasonable
man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental distress engen-
dered by the circumstances of the case." Id. at 163, 472 P.2d at 520.
69. Rodrigues v. State, 52 Hawaii 156, 472 P.2d 509 (1970).
70. Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831
(1980). The court viewed the physical injury requirement as "both overinclusive and underin-
clusive when viewed in light of its purported purpose of screening false claims." Id. at 928, 616
ous, in that the court used expansive language to abandon the re-
quirement of consequential physical injury, but appeared to leave the
Dillon rule intact.71 Despite the ambiguity, the Molien decision, at
the very least, affords plaintiffs who suffer serious emotional dis-
tress 72 absent impact or consequential injury the opportunity to state
their claims in court.7 3 This was the state of emotional distress law
that confronted the Bass court.
The Bass majority began its analysis with a brief discussion of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,4 and that doctrine's applicability
to the facts of the case. The court focused on three elements required
to sustain a cause of action under res ipsa loquitur,75 and deter-
mined that the plaintiff's evidence satisfied each of the elements.7 6
The court also noted that the doctrine frequently has been applied in
cases involving injuries caused by malfunctioning elevators.7 The
court first rejected the defendants' contention that the doctrine was
inapplicable because the elevator did not lurch or move violently,
stating that the stalling of the elevator was a "sudden unusual mal-
P.2d at 820, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 838. The requirement is overinclusive in that any physical
injury, no matter how trivial, suffices for recovery. It is underinclusive in that valid, possibly
provable claims are denied at the pleading stage. Id. Molien applies to cases in which the
plaintiff is a direct victim of negligence.
71. The three Dillon guidelines, see supra note 63 and accompanying text, appear to be
intact. See Hathaway v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. App. 3d 728, 737, 169 Cal. Rptr. 435, 440
(1980). See also Cortez v. Macias, 110 Cal. App. 3d 640, 167 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1980). It
appears that after Molien, the Dillon criteria are applicable only to "percipient witnesses" to
injury (the bystander scenario).
72. See supra note 68.
73. See generally Comment, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals: California Ex-
pands Liability for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Distress, supra note 9; Note, Negligent
Infliction of Emotional Distress Absent Physical Impact or Subsequent Physical Injury, 47
Mo. L. REV. 124 (1982).
74. The phrase "res ipsa loquitur" literally means "the thing itself speaks." The doc-
trine depends upon the strength of the inference that, given a certain injury, the defendant
must have been negligent. The mere occurrence of certain events is held to present a prima
facie case of negligence, which, unless defendant produces counter evidence that tends to show
the absence of negligence, enables the court to find the defendant guilty of negligence without
further proof. See BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1129 (3d ed. 1969). See also O'Dell v.
Whitworth, 618 S.W.2d 681 (Mo. App. 1981) (evidence must reasonably exclude the negli-
gence of the injured party as a contributing cause); Harke v. Haase, 335 Mo. 1104, 75 S.W.2d
1001 (1934) (prima facie case raises a substantial factual inference of defendant's negligence
which amounts to evidence, not presumption); see generally PROSSER, supra note 24, § 39.
75. Res ipsa loquitur applies when: (a) the occurrence resulting in injury does not
ordinarily occur if those in charge use due care; (b) the instrumentalities involved were under
the management and control of the defendant; and (c) the defendant possesses superior knowl-
edge or means of information as to the cause of the occurrence. PROSSER, supra note 24, § 39.
For a discussion of each element see McCloskey v. Koplar, 329 Mo. 527, 46 S.W.2d 557
(1932); Davis v. Jackson, 604 S.W.2d 610 (Mo. App. 1980); Neis v. National Super Mkt.
Inc., 631 S.W.2d 690 (Mo. App. 1982); Strick v. Stutsman, 633 S.W.2d 148 (Mo. App.
1982). See generally 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2509 (2d ed. 1935).
76. Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d at 768.
77. Id. See, e.g., Stroud v. Booth Cold Storage Co., 285 S.W. 165 (Mo. App. 1926);
Blanton v. Dold, 109 Mo. 64, 18 S.W. 1149 (1892); Meade v. Missouri Water & Steam
Supply Co., 318 Mo. 350, 300 S.W. 515 (1927); Warner v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 363 Mo.
1082, 257 S.W.2d 75 (1953); Bartlett v. Pontiac Realty Co., 224 Mo. App. 1234, 31 S.W.2d
279 (1930).
function which would not normally occur without negligence of the
parties in charge." ' The fact that two parties were joined as defen-
dants did not bar the application of res ipsa loquitur in the Bass
case because the jury could reasonably conclude that either or both
of the defendants were in control of the elevator."9 The majority
briefly dismissed this ancillary issue,8 and then addressed the appli-
cability of the impact rule.
The Bass decision ended the century-long adherence to the im-
pact rule in mental distress cases in the state of Missouri."1 The Bass
majority, after painstakingly reviewing the general history of the im-
pact rule,82 reasoned that the rule was entirely too rigid in its appli-
cation. The majority predicated this determination upon a careful
analysis, and subsequent rejection of the three reasons traditionally
stated in support of the impact rule. 3
The supposition that medical science is unable to prove a causal
connection between the alleged damage to the plaintiff and the negli-
gent act that supposedly induced the mental or emotional distress,
has long afforded justification for the impact rule." The Bass major-
ity refused to accept this rationale and relied on two factors to sup-
port its conclusion. First, the court pointed to the enormous advances
in the medical field that have "enabled science to establish with rea-
sonable medical certainty the existence and severity of psychic
harm."85 Second, the majority, relying on the decision in Niederman
v. Brodsky,"' concluded that although it still may be difficult for
78. Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d at 768.
79. Id. See Greet v. Otis Elevator Co., 187 A,2d 896 (Colo. Ct. App. 1963); Willis v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 421 S.W.2d 220 (Mo. 1967); Corcoran v. Banner Super Mkt., Inc., 19
N.Y.2d 425, 227 N.E.2d 304, 280 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1967); Crystal Tire Co., v. Home Serv. Oil
Co., 465 S.W.2d 531 (Mo. 1971). See generally 5 PERSONAL INJURY: ACTIONS, DEFENSES,
DAMAGES § 1.07 (L. Frumer ed. 1982).
80. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 768. The Missouri Court of Appeals did not rule on the issue
of res ipsa loquitur because the court determined that the plaintiff failed to make a submis-
sible case under the physical injury rule. Id. at 766 app.
81. See, e.g., Critcher v. Cleveland, C., C.& St. L. R.R., 132 Mo. App. 311, 111 S.W.
891 (1908) (first Missouri decision to apply a true impact rule although not by name); Trigg v.
St. Louis, K.C. & N. Ry., 74 Mo. 147 (1881); Oblatore v. Brauner, 283 F. Supp. 761 (W.D.
Mo. 1968); Williams v. School Dist. 447 S.W.2d 256 (Mo. 1969); Langworthy v. Pulitzer
Publishing Co., 368 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. 1963); McCardle v. George B. Peck Dry Goods Co.,
191 Mo. App. 263, 177 S.W. 1095 (1915); Chawkley v. Wabash Ry. Co., 317 Mo. 782, 297
S.W.2d (1927) (en banc).
82. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 768-72.
83. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text for a list of the three justifications
for the impact rule's existence.
84. Id.
85. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 769. See supra notes 9, 15-16.
86. 436 Pa. 401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970). See supra note 41 and accompanying text. The
Niederman court relied heavily on the rule in Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12
(1965), in deciding to abandon the impact rule. The court in Niederman decided that it was
not sufficient to precipitate the old impact rule in the name of precedent and liability should be
extended to provide redress for substantial wrongs, including injury resulting from mental dis-
tress. Niederman, 436 Pa. at 402, 261 A.2d at 86.
lawyers to prove, or for judges and jurors to understand the causal
connection, these complications are insufficient to prevent the plain-
tiff from bringing his case before the court or jury.8"
Judge Welliver, in his dissent, disagreed with the Bass major-
ity's reasoning with regard to the causal connection argument and
instead adopted the Missouri Court of Appeals rationale., The court
of appeals decision stated in relevant part that although society has
become complex and automated, "[a]utomatic devices and mechani-
cal contrivances are not foolproof' 8 9 and mechanical or electrical
malfunctions often cause fear. Judge Welliver argued that there is
no constitutional or legal right to a life free from worry, upset, or
mental distress; and some unpleasant occurrences must be tolerated
without resort to the courts for redress.9"
The majority in Bass also rejected the contention that the im-
pact rule is necessary to prevent fraudulent claims.91 Echoing other
courts' reasoning,92 the majority determined that the integrity of the
judicial system rests upon the notion that the courts must "find ways
to solve problems, not avoid them."9" The court relied on the deci-
sion of Falzone v. Busch,94 which stated in pertinent part, "a court
should not deny recovery for a type of wrong which may result in
serious harm because some people may institute fraudulent ac-
tions." 95 The Bass court agreed with the Falzone reasoning that
courts could guard against insufficient claims through the rules of
evidence and requirements of the sufficiency of the evidence; there-
fore, the impact rule's purported usefulness is without basis.96
The dissenting judge again disapproved of the majority's reason-
ing and focused on the subjective and unforeseeable nature of dam-
ages for mental distress unaccompanied by physical impact or con-
87. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 769. The Bass court quoted Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa.
401, 261 A.2d 84 (1970), and adopted the language set forth in that decision.
88. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 774. Judge Welliver, in his dissent, argued that the case was
not transferred "because of its failure to follow the law, but because of the desire of members
of this Court to change the law." Id. He then suggested that the court adopt the Missouri
Court of Appeals decision which he attached to his dissent as Appendix A. Id. Because Judge
Welliver adopted the court of appeals' decision on his own, discussion of the dissent focuses on
that decision.
89. Id. at 777.
90. Id. at 777-78.
91. Id. at 770.
92. See supra notes 29, 30 and 42 and accompanying text.
93. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 770.
94. 45 N.J. 559, 214 A.2d 12 (1965).
95. Id. at 563, 214 A.2d at 16. The Bass court did not follow the decision set forth in
Falzone, but merely adopted that court's repudiation of the impact rule. The Falzone court
allowed recovery if the requirements of the zone of danger rule were met. See supra notes 50-
56 and accompanying text.
96. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 770 (quoting Falzone v. Busch, 45 N.J. 559, 563, 214 A2d
12, 16 (1965)).
temporaneous physical injury.9" Judge Welliver relying on Missouri
case law,"8 asserted that damages for emotional distress are based on
guesswork and should be denied because such damages may be puni-
tive in nature." He also concluded that the reasonable man cannot
be expected to anticipate and guard against these remote injuries
emanating from the minds of plaintiffs in the absence of an initial
physical injury or impact.1"'
Finally, the Bass majority declined to conclude that the impact
rule is necessary to prevent the alleged flood of litigation which
might ensue if the judicial system permits claims for emotional dis-
tress without proof of impact or initial injury.10 1 The court noted
that jurisdictions that have abandoned the impact rule have not suf-
fered a barrage of litigation. 102 The majority concluded, as have
other jurisdictions which have abandoned the impact rule,10 3 that it
is "the duty of the courts to afford a forum for the remedy of
wrongs." ' 4 Judge Welliver, in a strong dissent on this point, stated
that a flood of litigation would result, with disasterous results.'
Judge Welliver reasoned that new courts would be needed to relieve
overcrowded dockets; existing high liability insurance premiums
would rise; and businesses planning to locate in Missouri would have
to take the increased costs into consideration. 16
Although the Bass majority criticized the rigid limitations in-
herent in the impact rule, the court did determine that some type of
limitation on recovery for mental distress had to be imposed. 1 7 The
court considered the standard set forth in the Restatement (Second)
97. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 778-79 app. See infra note 100.
98. See supra notes 77 and 81. See also Francis v. St. Louis Transfer Co., 5 Mo. App.
7 (1877); Connell v. Western Union Tel. Co., 116 Mo. 34, 22 S.W. 345 (1893); Warner v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 428 S.W.2d 596 (Mo. 1968); Brisboise v. Kansas City Public
Serv. Co., 303 S.W.2d 619 (Mo. 1957) (en banc); Pretsky v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 396
S.W.2d 566 (Mo. 1965).
99. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 779 app. The dissent reasoned that damages originating in the
mind of the claimant are subjective and esoteric in nature, and therefore, are not calculable
under conventional standards. The damages would be punitive, but punitive damages are not
to be awarded in cases involving negligence, as opposed to intentional or malicious conduct. Id.
100. Id. at 779-80 app. Physical impact does not necessarily result in contemporaneous
physical injury, but courts use these terms interchangeably. Often courts also interchange the
phrases "impact rule" and "physical injury" rule. See, e.g., Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 776 app.
Rarely will a plaintiff who suffered impact and resultant emotional distress be denied recovery
under either rule simply because he did not suffer initial bodily injury at the time of impact.
See supra note 29.
101. Id. at 770.
102. Id. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 28-30, 46-49, 52-56, 59-73 and accompanying text.
104. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 770.
105. Id. at 774 app.
106. Id. This is an example of the stance taken by jurisdictions that are reluctant to
extend the zone of liability in mental distress cases. Under this posture, these courts emphasize
the economic well-being of the state over the redress of individuals who suffer from severe
disabilities. See supra note 23.
107. Id. at 772.
of Torts,"'8 which delineated a distinction between mental and physi-
cal injury, but declined to adopt it. 10 9 The court reasoned that the
rule set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts was merely "the
replacement of one arbitrary, artificial rule [the impact rule] with
another which [is] only somewhat less restrictive."' 1 0 The Bass court
based this determination in part on the decision in Todd v. Goos-
tree,"' in which the Missouri Court of Appeals abandoned the dis-
tinction between physical and mental injury in workman's compensa-
tion cases. 1 2 The Todd decision indicated both the impending
abandonment of the impact rule, and the Missouri Supreme Court's
growing realization that the distinction between physical and mental
injury is virtually impossible to establish." 3
Based upon both logical and practical considerations, the Bass
court abandoned the classic impact rule as well as any requirement
that "physical injury" result from the emotional distress." 4 The Bass
court adopted as its new standard a liberal approach predicated upon
both the foreseeability and the severity of emotional or mental dis-
tress. The California Supreme Court first set forth this liberalized
standard in the frequently cited case of Molien v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospital"5 and stated that a plaintiff may be able to recover for
negligently inflicted emotional distress unaccompanied by impact or
consequential physical injury provided that three tests are met: the
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313(1) (1965) states:
If the actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to another, he is sub-
ject to liability to the other for resulting illness or bodily harm if the actor
(a) should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of
causing the distress . . . and
(b) from the facts known to him should have realized that the distress, if it
were caused, might result in illness or bodily harm.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436(l) (1965) states:
If the actor's conduct is negligent as violating a duty of care designed to
protect another from a fright or other emotional disturbance which the actor
should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, the fact that
the harm results solely through the internal operation of the fright or other emo-
tional disturbances does not protect the actor from liability.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A states in pertinent part:
If the actor's conduct is negligent . . . and it results in such emotional dis-
turbance alone, without bodily harm or other compensable damage, the actor is
not liable for such emotional disturbance.
109. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 771-72.
110. Id. at 771. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
I11. 493 S.W.2d 411 (Mo. App. 1973).
112. Id. In Todd, the plaintiff-employee suffered severe emotional shock after he discov-
ered the crushed body of his fellow worker beneath the wheels of his truck. The court favored
recovery and reasoned that disability resulting from shock, fright, or other emotional stimulus
is "accidental or personal injury" within the requirements of the Workmen's Compensation
Act. This decision effectively abolished the distinction between physical and mental injury in
workman's compensation cases in Missouri.
113. See supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
114. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 772.
115. 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980). See supra notes 66-73
and accompanying text.
plaintiff's mental injury must be reasonably foreseeable to the defen-
dant, imposing upon the defendant a duty to refrain from or prevent
the hazardous conduct or occurrence; the plaintiff's emotional dis-
tress must be "serious" in that an ordinary person would be unable
to cope with the incident and would succumb to distress;116 and ei-
ther the circumstances of the case must establish a guarantee of a
genuine claim or the plaintiff can introduce "medically significant
evidence of serious emotional distress.""' 7 In the final analysis, the
Missouri Supreme Court applied the new standard to the facts of
Bass and determined the questions for retrial to be whether the de-
fendants could foresee that an ordinary person would succumb to
serious emotional distress resulting from confinement in an elevator,
and whether plaintiffis emotional distress was sufficiently severe to
be legally cognizable." 8
Bass is the first Missouri case to hold that a direct victim of a
negligent act may recover for mental distress or emotional suffering
absent impact or consequential physical injury. The court's analysis
reflects the ever-present tension in the tort law between two theories
of recovery. One theory, which states that "for every wrong there
should be an available remedy" directly conflicts with the struggle to
limit liability. The Bass court renounced the arbitrary and unjust
results that ensue from attempts to clearly delineate the limits of
liability; however, public policy dictates that some limits must be im-
posed. The Bass decision abandoned the most conservative rule, the
impact rule, and adopted the most liberal standard to date. It is
ironic to note that before Bass, large recoveries were granted for
trivial impacts and resulting mental distress, while no recovery was
allowed for serious emotional harm, sometimes accompanied by
grave physical disability, absent impact. The rule in Bass then
clearly ameliorates the impact rule. Although courts find it difficult
to devise a rule for emotional distress cases that is both equitable
and unclouded by ambiguity, Bass indicates that someday the stan-
dards in this controversial area of the tort law will reflect positive
societal changes and will become more clearly defined with time.
116. See supra note 68.
117. Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 772-73. Judge Donnelly filed a short dissent in which he ar-
gued that the circumstances of the case were not appropriate for judicial abrogation of the
"impact rule." The question surrounding the abandonment of the impact rule "seems suited
for legislative action." Id. at 781 (quoting Epple v. Western Auto Supply Co., 557 S.W.2d
253, 254 (Mo. 1977) (en banc)). Judge Donnelly, criticizing the majority's adoption of a
"medically significant" rule, stated, "[t]he logic and 'practicality' of such action elude me.
What does 'medically significant' mean in a courtroom?" Id.
118. Id. at 773-74. The court noted that if a possibility of proof exists that the plaintiff
has not fully developed, remand is permissible. See, e.g., Franklin v. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co.,
627 S.W.2d 110 (Mo. App. 1982); Bolhofner v. Jones, 482 S.W.2d 80 (Mo. App. 1972).
[Casenote by Linda J. Cowell]
